Bankruptcy Law by Tice, Hon. Douglas O., Jr. et al.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 1 Article 6
11-1-2012
Bankruptcy Law
Hon. Douglas O. Tice Jr.
Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court
K. Elizabeth Sieg
McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia
David W. Gaffey
Whiteford Taylor & Preston LLP, Falls Church, Virginia
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hon. Douglas O. Tice Jr., K. E. Sieg & David W. Gaffey, Bankruptcy Law, 47 U. Rich. L. Rev. 51 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss1/6
BANKRUPTCY LAW
The Honorable Douglas 0. Tice, Jr. *
K Elizabeth Sieg **
David W. Gaffey ***
I. INTRODUCTION
This article continues the survey of bankruptcy and insolvency
case law that was initiated in November 2009.1 The article covers
both consumer and business bankruptcy issues and is restricted
primarily to decisions published by courts in the Fourth Circuit
and the Supreme Court of the United States since the 2009 arti-
cle. It is the desire of the authors to provide an interesting sam-
pling of the most common issues from the bankruptcy and insol-
vency field. Perhaps the most significant decision of all, and
certainly the most discussed during the past year, is the Supreme
Court's 2011 ruling in Stern v. Marshall limiting the authority of
bankruptcy judges to enter final orders involving issues arising
under state law. The full impact of Stern both nationally and in
the Fourth Circuit remains to be seen. However, the authors be-
lieve most matters of bankruptcy administration will continue to
be carried out by the bankruptcy courts with little impact from
Stern. It is the authors' goal to provide practitioners with a useful
tool for research in the various areas covered in the article.
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II. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY
An issue that appears destined for the Supreme Court is
whether the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act ("BAPCPA") amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
abrogated the absolute priority rule for individual debtors in
Chapter 11, as courts across the country have reached opposite
but equally plausible conclusions via a multitude of different ra-
tionales and arguments. The Fourth Circuit recently became the
first court of appeals to address the issue in the case of In re Ma-
haraj.3 Acknowledging that the language of the BAPCPA is am-
biguous, the court analyzed the history of the absolute priority
rule and the legislative history of the BAPCPA, and concluded
that Congress did not intend to repeal the absolute priority rule
4in individual Chapter 11 cases.
The debtors, Ganess and Vena Maharaj, were the owners and
operators of an auto body repair shop in Chantilly, Virginia.5 Af-
ter falling victim to an apparent fraud that saddled them with
considerable debt, the debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, as their debts exceed-
ed the limits for proceeding under Chapter 13.6 The debtors'
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization proposed that the debtors
"would continue to own and operate their auto body business and
use income from the business to pay" their creditors.7 After one
class of general unsecured creditors voted to reject the plan, the
debtors attempted to "cram down" the plan over the unsecured
creditors' objection under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), arguing that the
absolute priority rule no longer applied to individual Chapter 11
debtors and that the debtors could permissibly retain their own-
ership interest in the business.8 The bankruptcy court disagreed,
however, and denied confirmation of the debtors' plan.9
Prior to the BAPCPA amendments in 2005, there was no doubt
that the absolute priority rule applied to individual Chapter 11
debtors. Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) stated that in order to be fair
3. 681 F.3d 558, 560 (4th Cir. 2012).
4. See id. at 575.
5. Id. at 566.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 567.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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and equitable, a plan must provide that "the holder of any claim
or interest that is junior to the claims of such [dissenting] class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property .. .. ",' Post-BAPCPA, § 1129(b)
(2)(B)(ii) now states that, to be fair and equitable, a plan must
provide that
the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
[dissenting] class will not receive or retain under the plan on account
of such junior claim or interest any property, except that in a case in
which the debtor is an individual, the debtor may retain property in-
cluded in the estate under section 1115, subject to the requirements of
subsection (a)(4) of[§ 1129]."
Section 1115, which was added to the Bankruptcy Code by the
BAPCPA, 2 in turn provides:
(a) In a case in which the debtor is an individual, property of the es-
tate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541-
(1) all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before
the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dis-
missed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13,
whichever occurs first.'
3
The court then discussed the split of authority that has devel-
oped across the country in response to these amendments. Courts
adopting the "broad view" of the BAPCPA amendments have
found that by including in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) a cross-reference to
§ 1115, which references § 541 defining property of the bankrupt-
cy estate, Congress intended to authorize an individual Chapter
11 debtor to retain all property of the estate and therefore effec-
tively abrogated the absolute priority rule. 4 Courts adopting the
"narrow view," however, have found "that Congress did not intend
such a sweeping change to" the Bankruptcy Code and have held
that the BAPCPA amendments only permit an individual Chap-
10. Id. at 562 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
12. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §
321, 119 Stat. 23, 94-95 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006)).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1115.
14. In re Maharaj, 681 F.3d at 563.
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ter 11 debtor "to retain property and earnings acquired after the
commencement of the case.""
In In re Maharaj, the Fourth Circuit began its analysis by find-
ing that the language of the statute was ambiguous and that both
the broad and narrow interpretations of the BAPCPA amend-
ments espoused plausible interpretations of congressional in-
tent.16 As such, the court then analyzed the context in which the
amendments were enacted and the broader context of the
BAPCPA."7 The court noted that prior to the BAPCPA, property of
the estate did not include post-petition earnings.'8 Post-petition
property and earnings therefore could be retained by a debtor
without violating the absolute priority rule. 9 As § 1115 now has
added post-petition earnings and property to the property of the
estate, revised § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which exempted from the abso-
lute priority rule property added to the estate by § 1115, pre-
serves only the pre-BAPCPA status quo by permitting a debtor to
retain post-petition earnings and property."'
The court further found that the Supreme Court's strong aver-
sion to implied repeal, especially in the bankruptcy context, sup-
ported its conclusion that the BAPCPA amendments did not ab-
rogate the absolute priority rule.2 Citing the 2010 decision in
Hamilton v. Lanning, the court stated that "courts 'will not read
the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a
clear indication that Congress intended such a departure."'22 The
court then analyzed the history of prior amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, finding that when Congress amended the prior
Bankruptcy Act in 1952 to eliminate the "fair and equitable" re-
quirement underlying the absolute priority rule, it did so in a
clear manner and explained its actions in the accompanying legis-
lative history.23 The court concluded that "[h]istory shows that
Congress knows how to abrogate the absolute priority rule, and it
15. Id.
16. Id. at 569.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting In re Karlovich, 456 B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010)).
19. Id. (quoting In re Karlovich, 456 B.R. at 681).
20. Id. at 570 (quoting In re Karlovich, 456 B.R. at 681).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 571 (citing Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S ..... 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2467
(2010)).
23. Id. at 572.
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has not done so here."4 Accordingly, the court held that the abso-
lute priority rule was not abolished by the BAPCPA amendments
25
and remains in full force in individual Chapter 11 cases.
III. ABUSE
Section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code furnishes courts with a
powerful weapon to police perceived abuses of the bankruptcy
process by Chapter 7 debtors.26 Faced with the dismissal or con-
version of their cases, debtors understandably have sought to re-
strict the application of § 707. In the Fourth Circuit case of Cal-
houn v. United States Trustee, the debtor appealed a decision of
the bankruptcy court that a court may dismiss a case for abuse of
the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) even if a presumption of
abuse does not arise under the means test imposed by
§ 707(b)(2). 7 After incurring significant debt from a home renova-
tion, followed by an unexpected decline in the balance of their in-
vestment accounts, the debtors entered into a payment plan with
a credit management company that paid their creditors $2638 per
month. 8 The debtors continued this payment plan for twenty-two
months, whereupon they chose to discontinue the plan because
the budget imposed by the plan did not leave sufficient income for
unexpected expenses." The debtors then filed for bankruptcy un-
der Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code."
Under § 707(b)(1), as amended by the BAPCPA, a court may
dismiss "a case filed by an individual debtor under [Chapter 7)
whose debts are primarily consumer debts.., if it finds that the
granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chap-
ter."3 A rebuttable presumption of abuse arises under § 707(b)(2)
if the debtor's income exceeds the highest median family income
of the applicable state for the debtor's family size and the debtor's
income and expenses do not satisfy the "means test," a complex
formula that takes into account the debtor's income and certain
24. Id. at 573.
25. Id. at 574.
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
27. 650 F.3d 338, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2011).
28. Id. at 340.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
20121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
deductible expenses." Section 707(b)(3) also permits a court to
dismiss a case for abuse if the debtor filed the petition in bad
faith or if the "totality of the circumstances ... of the debtor's fi-
nancial situation demonstrates abuse. 33
For purposes of the means test under § 707(b)(2), the debtors
received $7313 in monthly income, excluding Social Security in-
come, and were eligible for $7330.19 in monthly deductions.34 Alt-
hough the debtors exceeded the relevant highest median family
income, the debtors' expenses, when subtracted from their in-
come, left a net monthly income that did not give rise to a pre-
sumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2). 5 The bankruptcy court,
however, dismissed the debtors' case under § 707(b)(3) on the
grounds that the "totality of the [debtors'] financial situation evi-
denced an abuse of Chapter 7" because there was no illness, ca-
lamity, disability, or unemployment that precipitated the debtors'
bankruptcy filing, and the debtors had the ability to repay their
debts.36
On appeal, the debtors contended, inter alia, that the means
test is conclusive of eligibility for Chapter 7 relief.3 7 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the means test pro-
vides only a formula by which a court can presume abuse and
dismiss a case.3" As the test is not conclusive and the presumption
is rebuttable, a court still may find abuse under § 707(b)(3) even
if a presumption of abuse does not arise under the means test.3 9
The court then found that the bankruptcy court recited "a multi-
tude of factors weighing in favor of abuse" and found no error in
the bankruptcy court's findings." Accordingly, the court affirmed
the dismissal of the debtors' case.1
In In re Lassiter, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia confronted the issue of whether § 707(b) of the Bank-
32. Calhoun, 650 F.3d at 340-41 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2), (6), (7)).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B).
34. Calhoun, 650 F.3d at 341.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 342.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 339.
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ruptcy Code applies to converted Chapter 7 cases.42 The debtors in
Lassiter filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 and later con-
verted the case to Chapter 7." After the United States trustee
filed a statement of abuse pursuant to § 704(b)(1)(A) because the
debtors' monthly income exceeded the limitations imposed by the
means test, the debtors filed a motion to convert the case back to
Chapter 13 . The debtors then filed an amended motion to con-
vert, asserting "that they should not be forced to reconvert their
case" because § 707(b), which permits a bankruptcy court to con-
vert or dismiss a Chapter 7 case for "abuse of the provisions of
[Chapter 7]," does not apply to cases filed under another chapter
of the Bankruptcy Code and subsequently converted to Chapter
7 45
The court rejected this argument.4 First noting that the lan-
guage of § 707(b) is ambiguous and not susceptible to a single
clear reading, the court analyzed similar provisions in other
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code to gain insight into Congress's
intentY.4  Sections 1112(b)(1), 1208(b), and 1307(b)-all dealing
with conversion or dismissal of cases under their respective chap-
ters-include the phrase "dismiss a case under this chapter"
without the additional language present in § 707(b). ' The court
found that as these sections "permit the court to dismiss any case
pending under the respective chapter, not just cases filed under
the respective chapter," Congress intended § 707(b) to operate in
a similar manner. 9 By inserting "filed by an individual debtor" in
§ 707(b), the court concluded, Congress thereby meant only to
prevent courts from dismissing Chapter 7 cases filed by corpora-
tions or other business entities.0
42. 65 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1615, 1616 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 24, 2011).
43. Id. at 1616-17.
44. Id. at 1617.
45. Id. The language of § 707(b) at issue here states,
After notice and a hearing, the court... may dismiss a case filed by an indi-
vidual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts,
or, with the debtor's consent, convert such a case to a case under chapter 11
or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting of relief would be an abuse of
the provisions of this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006).
46. In re Lassiter, 65 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) at 1618.
47. Id. at 1618, 1619, 1620 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1)).
48. Id. at 1619 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1i12(b)(1), 1208(b), 1307(b), 707(b)(1) (2006)).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 1619-20.
20121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The court also noted that this interpretation would prevent the
creation of two classes of Chapter 7 debtors: those who file under
Chapter 7 initially and are subject to § 707(b) and those who con-
vert their case to Chapter 7 and are immune from § 707(b)'s stric-
tures.5 This result would create an avenue for those debtors una-
ble to meet the requirements of the means test to bypass the
means test altogether and enjoy the benefits of Chapter 7 simply
by filing under another chapter and later converting the case."
Accordingly, the court held that the word "filed" as used in
§ 707(b) incorporated the conversion of cases from other chapters
of the Bankruptcy Code. 3
In In re Penninger, the Schedule J filed by the debtors on the
petition date showed an income of $408 per month.54 Over the en-
suing seven months, the debtors' income drastically increased,
prompting the United States bankruptcy administrator to file a
motion to dismiss the debtors' case for abuse under §§ 707(b)(1)
and 707(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.5" At the time of the hearing
on the administrator's motion, the debtors' income had risen to
$1407 per month. 6 The debtors did not dispute that their income,
as of the hearing date, could provide a one hundred percent dis-
tribution to creditors and would have been abusive under § 707(b)
had the case been filed on that date. 7
The debtors nevertheless opposed the administrator's motion
on the grounds that abuse for the purposes of §§ 707(b)(1) and
707(b)(3) should be determined as of the petition date and that
subsequent changes to the debtor's financial situation should not
be considered in the abuse analysis.58 The Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina agreed with the adminis-
trator, however, holding that the plain language of § 707(b) per-
mits a court to consider a debtor's financial circumstances at the
time of the hearing. 9 According to the court, § 707(b) "focuses on
whether granting a Chapter 7 discharge would be an abuse, not
51. id. at 1622.
52. Id. at 1623.
53. id. at 1620.
54. No. 10-52061, 2011 WL 2709321, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. July 8, 2011).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *2.
59. See id.
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whether the filing of the petition was an abuse."' The court also
noted that § 707(b)(3) permits a court to consider "the totality of
the circumstances ... of the debtor's financial situation."6 The
court thus granted the administrator's motion, finding that the
totality of the debtors' financial situation constituted an abuse of
Chapter 7 under § 707(b)(3).
lV. AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
In Goldman v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., the Chapter 7
trustee brought suit against several defendants to avoid a series
of transfers of a parcel of real estate originally owned by the
debtor.6 The initial and secondary transferees of the property en-
tered into consent orders with the trustee avoiding the transfers. 64
The tertiary transferee, Capital City Mortgage Corporation
("CCM"), a lender specializing in high-interest loans to high-risk
individuals and businesses, asserted that the transfer was not
avoidable pursuant to § 550(b)(1) as it had taken the property "for
value,.., in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability
of the transfer.,
65
While there was no dispute that CCM had taken the property
for value, and while the court found that CCM did not have actu-
al knowledge of the voidability of the transfer, the court found
that the transfer was avoidable because CCM had not taken the
property in good faith.66 The court first reaffirmed its holding in
Smith v. Mixon that "knowledge" includes only actual notice but
clarified that the "knowledge" requirement is satisfied where a
transferee knew facts that would lead a reasonable person to be-
lieve that the transfer was recoverable. 7 Although a transferee
has no duty to investigate where nothing suggests that a transfer
may be avoidable, actual knowledge of facts that would lead a
60. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2006)).
61. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See id. at *3.
63. 648 F.3d 232, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 236.
65. See id. at 234, 237 (alteration in original) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2006)).
66. Id. at 240-41.
67. Id. at 237, 238 (citing Smith v. Mixon, 788 F.2d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1988); IRS v.
Nordic Vill., Inc. (In re Nordic Vill., Inc.), 915 F.2d 1049, 1055 (6th Cir. 1990)).
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
reasonable person to believe that a transfer is voidable is suffi-
cient to permit the avoidance of a mediate transfer.8
The court then addressed the good faith requirement of
§ 550(b)(1), holding that good faith must be viewed under an ob-
jective standard. 9 The court held that a transferee does not act in
good faith when it has sufficient actual knowledge to put it on in-
quiry notice of the debtor's possible insolvency or the avoidability
of a transfer. ' Reviewing the actions of CCM prior to the transfer,
the court found that, despite numerous red flags indicating that
the transfer of the property from the secondary transferee to
CCM might be fraudulent, CCM failed to verify the credentials of
the transferee, to investigate the title history of the property, or
to take any steps to ensure the legitimacy of the transfer that
would be expected of a reasonable lender in similar circumstanc-
es.7' Accordingly, the court found that CCM's failure to investi-
gate constituted bad faith that precluded CCM from asserting
§ 550(b)(1) as a defense to the transfer.2
In Siegel v. Russellville Steel Co. (In re Circuit City Stores,
Inc.), a liquidating trustee sought, under § 547(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, to avoid and recover several payments made by the
debtor within ninety days of the petition date. 3 While conceding
that the transfers were preferences under § 547(b), the defendant
asserted that the payments were made in the ordinary course of
business and were therefore not avoidable pursuant to
§ 547(c)(2)(A).4 The primary issue to be decided by the court was
the relevant baseline to determine the ordinary course of business
between the debtor and the defendant. 76
The trustee argued that the court should consider the entire
business relationship between the debtor and the defendant to
identify the ordinary payment practices between the parties.76
The defendant, in contrast, advanced an arbitrary and fixed
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 238 (citing Gold v. Laines (In re Laines), 352 B.R. 397, 406 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2005)).
71. See id. at 241-42.
72. Id. at 241.
73. No. 08-35653, 2012 WL 1981781, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 1, 2012).
74. Id. at *l, *3.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id.
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twelve-month lookback period." Finding that twelve-month look-
back period advocated by the defendant would unnecessarily con-
strain the court's ability to ascertain the parties' "ordinary"
course of conduct, the court determined that it was appropriate to
consider the entire business history between the debtor and the
defendant."
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Advo-System, Inc. v.
Maxway Corp., the court then held that the ordinary course of
business between the parties must be determined by their con-
duct prior to the onset of insolvency. 9 The court noted that follow-
ing a significant decline in the liquidity of the debtor, which the
court found marked the onset of insolvency for purposes of this
case, the payment practices between the debtor and the defend-
ant changed significantly." Comparing the pre- and post-
insolvency payment practices, the court held that the payments
in question were not made in the ordinary course of business and
were therefore avoidable.81
In In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., Mitsubishi Digital Electronics
America, Inc., filed an administrative priority claim under
§ 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code for the value of goods trans-
ferred to the debtors during the twenty-day period immediately
preceding the petition date." The debtor filed an objection to this
claim under § 502(d) on the grounds that Mitsubishi had received
preferential transfers under § 547, and sought to temporarily dis-
allow the § 503(b)(9) claim pending the resolution of the prefer-
ence issue.8 The debtors and Mitsubishi entered into a settlement
agreement establishing a fully funded reserve, for the exclusive
benefit of Mitsubishi, sufficient to pay the § 503(b)(9) claim, from
which funds would be released to pay any ultimately allowed
amount of the claim. 4
Following the initiation of an adversary proceeding seeking to
avoid and recover the alleged preferential transfers, Mitsubishi
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id.
79. id. at *4-5 (citing Advo-System, Inc. v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1049 (4th
Cir. 1994)).
80. Id. at *5-6 & n.9.
81. Id. at *6.
82. 64 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1314, 1317 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2010).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1317-18.
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asserted a defense under the new value exception set forth in
§ 547(c)(4) contending that the value of the transferred goods
comprising the § 503(b)(9) claim also can serve as "new value." 5
The debtors filed a motion for partial summary judgment, assert-
ing that Mitsubishi could not use the goods transferred within the
twenty days preceding the petition date as a basis for both a new
value defense and a § 503(b)(9) administrative claim.'
After analyzing the text of § 547(c)(4), the court agreed with
the debtor. As the parties stipulated that Mitsubishi did make a
contribution of new value to the debtors, the court examined
whether Mitsubishi had received an "'otherwise unavoidable
transfer"' from the debtors on account of the new value.87 The
court first concluded that the establishment of the fully funded
reserve constituted a 'transfer to or for the benefit of [the] credi-
tor' on account of the subsequent new value" because the debtors
had "parted with their interest in the monies that have been set
aside in the reserve fund for the exclusive 'benefit of
Mitsubishi."88 The allowance of the claim had been only temporar-
ily deferred pending resolution of the preference issue, and the
right of Mitsubishi to the total amount of any allowed § 503(b)(9)
claim for the value of the transferred goods was absolute. 9 Next,
finding that § 549 did not apply because the creation of the re-
serve fund was approved by the court and that §§ 544, 547, 548,
and 553(b) apply only to pre-petition transfers, the court conclud-
ed that the transfer was "otherwise unavoidable."9 Thus, the
court held that Mitsubishi either could claim an administrative
expense under § 503(b)(9) or use the value of the goods provided
to support a § 547(c)(4) new value defense, but it could not do
both.9'
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1318-19.
87. Id. at 1322 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 549(c)(4)(B) (2006)).
88. Id. at 1322-23 (alteration in original) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4)(B) (2006)).
89. Id. at 1322.
90. Id. at 1324-25 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4)(B)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
91. Id. at 1327.
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V. CRAM DOWN OF SECURITY INTEREST IN CHAPTER 13,
DEBTOR'S PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE
"Cram down" refers to, among other things, a debtor's ability to
bifurcate a secured creditor's claim into secured and unsecured
portions when the value of the property is less than the total
amount that remains owing on the debt." For example, if a debtor
owes $150,000 to her mortgage lender, but the house is worth on-
ly $100,000, under certain circumstances, a debtor could treat on-
ly $100,000 as a secured claim and treat the remaining $50,000
as an unsecured claim. When the debtor is in Chapter 13, and the
debt is secured by "a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence," however, cram down is unavailable
under § 1322(b)(2). s
In Ennis v. Green Tree Servicing (In re Ennis), the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court, addressed a
question left open by the BAPCPA addition of a definition of the
"debtor's principal residence" as including a mobile home even if
it is not attached to underlying real property. 9 In that case, the
Chapter 13 joint debtors owned a mobile home and filed a Chap-
ter 13 plan that proposed cramming down the lender's security
interest in the mobile home." The lender objected and asserted
that the plan could not be confirmed under § 1322(b)(2) because
the debtors used the mobile home as their principal residence.8
The bankruptcy court agreed with the lender, but on appeal the
Fourth Circuit disagreed and reversed.97 The Fourth Circuit held
that § 1322(b)(2) contains two distinct requirements-first, that
the security interest must be in real property, and second, that
the real property must be the debtor's principal residence.98 The
court explained:
The definition of "debtor's principal residence" addresses only the se-
cond requirement, "leaving the explicit 'real property' [requirement],
untouched." Not only does the "debtor's principal residence" defini-
tion avoid defining "real property," but the definition also makes
92. See Shaw v. Aurgroup Fin. Credit Union, 552 F.3d 447, 449-451 (6th Cir. 2009)
(internal citations omitted).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).
94. 558 F.3d 343, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See id. at 345.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 344.
98. Id. at 345-46.
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clear that whether a structure is a principal residence is independ-
ent of whether it might be real property. Specifically, the definition
states that a "debtor's principal residence ... means a residential
structure ... without regard to whether that structure is attached to
real property." 9
In short, the Fourth Circuit held that "the real property re-
quirement of § 1322(b)(2)'s anti-modification clause survives the
definition of 'debtor's principal residence."""0 Thus, the anti-
modification clause of § 1322(b)(2) applies only to real property
that is a debtor's principal residence.10'
VI. DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
In Hamilton v. Lanning, the Supreme Court resolved a
longstanding dispute over how to calculate a debtor's "projected
disposable income" for purposes of § 1325(b)(1)." 2 Under this sec-
tion, if the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to the confir-
mation of a debtor's Chapter 13 plan, the plan only may be ap-
proved if the creditor's claim is paid in full or if the plan provides
that "the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in
the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the
first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make pay-
ments to unsecured creditors under the plan."'0 8 While "projected
disposable income" is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code,
"'[d]isposable income' is ... defined as 'current monthly income
received by the debtor' less 'amounts reasonably necessary to be
expanded' for the debtor's maintenance and support."' "Current
monthly income" is calculated by averaging the debtor's monthly
income during the six months prior to the petition date.'
The debtor in Hamilton received a one-time buyout from her
former employer during the six months prior to the petition date,
thus significantly inflating her "current monthly income" calcula-
99. Id. at 346 (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. 560 U.S . . 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2469 (2010).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2006).
104. Hamilton, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1325(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii)).
105. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2470 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(i) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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tion.106 Due to this buyout, the debtor reported a disposable in-
come of $1114.98 on her Form 22C."07 On the debtor's Schedule I
and Schedule J, however, the debtor reported the income from
her new job as $1922 per month with expenses of $1772.97, leav-
ing a monthly disposable income of only $149.03.1" Based on her
new income, the debtor filed a plan that required her to pay $144
per month for thirty-six months.9
The Chapter 13 trustee objected on the grounds that the debtor
was not committing all of her "projected disposable income" to the
plan, arguing that her projected disposable income should be cal-
culated by multiplying the disposable income listed on the debt-
or's Form 22C by the applicable commitment period."' According
to the trustee, this "mechanical approach" required a payment of
$756 per month for a period of sixty months.' The bankruptcy
court rejected the mechanical approach favored by the trustee
and upheld the debtor's proposed $144 monthly payment, but re-
quired a sixty-month plan period."2 On appeal by the trustee,
both the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's
ruling. 11
In affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that,
while the mechanical approach advocated by the trustee is appro-
priate in most cases, the forward-looking approach utilized by the
debtor is permissible "where significant changes in a debtor's fi-
nancial circumstances are known or virtually certain."114 The
Court first examined the meaning of "projected disposable in-
come," finding that, as the term is not defined by the Bankruptcy
Code, the ordinary meaning of "projected" should control."' Thus,
"While a projection takes past events into account, adjustments
106. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2470 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at _ 130 S. Ct. at 2470.
108. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2470.
109. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2470.
110. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2470 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2470.
112. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2470 (citing In re Lanning, Nos. 06-41037, -41260, 2007
WL 1451999, at *8 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 15, 2007)).
113. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2471 (citing In re Lanning, 380 B.R. 17, 19 (2007); In re
Lanning, 595 F.3d 1269, 1270 (2008)).
114. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2471.
115. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2471 (quoting Asgrow Seed Co. v, Winterboer, 513 U.S.
179, 187 (1995)).
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are often made based on other factors that may affect the final
outcome."'16 The Court next noted that "projected," as used in oth-
er federal statutes, rarely means simple multiplication. 1 7 Had
Congress intended that "projected disposable income" involve a
simple mathematical calculation, it would have specified so by us-
ing the term "multiplied" as it does in other areas of the Bank-
ruptcy Code." 8 Third, the Court found that pre-BAPCPA courts
permitted debtors to deviate from the mechanical approach, as
the debtor proposed to do, when the circumstances warranted." '9
As BAPCPA did not clearly alter this practice, the Court refused
to "read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice
absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a depar-
ture.""12 The Court therefore concluded that a debtor's projected
disposable income calculation "may account for changes in the
debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at
the time of confirmation.'
12
1
Ransom v. FLA Card Services, N.A. resolved a split among the
circuits regarding whether a Chapter 13 debtor may properly
claim expenses on the means test calculation imposed by
§ 1325(b)(3) that the debtor does not actually incur." 2 Under
Chapter 13, a debtor must pay creditors a sum equal or greater to
the debtor's monthly disposable income multiplied by the number
of months in the plan term.' Section 1325(b)(2) "defines 'dispos-
able income' as 'current monthly income' less 'amounts reasona-
bly necessary to be expended' for 'maintenance or support,' busi-
ness expenditures, and certain charitable contributions."'24 If a
debtor's income exceeds the median income for the applicable
state, the means test set forth in § 707 defines the expenses that
qualify as "amounts reasonably necessary" to support the debt-
or.115 Section 707 provides that a debtor's monthly expenses are
116. Id. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 2472 (citing In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 312 n.9 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2007)).
117. Id. at __ 130 S, Ct. at 2472 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 2472 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
119. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2472 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at-_, 130 S. Ct. at 2473 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
121. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2478.
122. 562 U.S .... _, 131 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2011) (citing Ransom v. MBNA, 559 U.S.
- 130 S. Ct. 2097 (2012)).
123. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 721.
124. Id. at__, 131 S. Ct. at 721 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (2006 & Supp.
IV 2010)).
125. Id. at__, 131 S. Ct. at 721-22.
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determined by the monthly amounts specified under the National
Standards and Local Standards guidelines issued by the Internal
Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides.'2 6
In Ransom, the debtor owned a 2004 Toyota Camry free of any
debt. 27 On the means test, the debtor claimed a car ownership
deduction in the amount of $471 as well as a separate car operat-
ing costs deduction in the amount of $338.28 The creditor, FIA
Card Services, subsequently objected to the debtor's Chapter 13
plan, asserting that the debtor improperly lowered his disposable
income calculation by claiming the car ownership deduction for a
car on which he made no loan or lease payments.'29 The bank-
ruptcy court denied confirmation of the debtor's plan, holding
that he only could deduct vehicle-ownership expenses if he was
currently making loan or lease payments on the vehicle.'30 Both
the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the bankruptcy
court.'31
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of ap-
peals. 32 Noting that § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) states that "[t]he debtor's
monthly expenses shall be the debtor's applicable monthly ex-
pense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local
Standards," the Court applied the plain meaning of the statute
and found that a debtor may claim a deduction "only if that de-
duction is appropriate for him.""'3 A deduction is only appropriate
"if the debtor will incur that kind of expense during the life of the
plan."'34 The Court further found that this interpretation is sup-
ported by the language in § 1325(b) defining a debtor's disposable
income as his "current monthly income. . . less amounts reasona-
126. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 722 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(1) (2006 & Supp.
IV 2010)).
127. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 723 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 722 (citations omitted).
129. See id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 723 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 723 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 723 (citing In re Ransom, 380 B.R. 799, 808-09 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007); In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004)).
132. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 723.
133. Id. at - 131 S. Ct. at 724 (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted).
134. Id. at -_, 131 S. Ct. at 724.
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bly necessary to be expended."'' 6 As Congress intended the means
test to approximate a debtor's actual and reasonable expenditures
on essential items, "a debtor should be required to qualify for a
deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant cate-
gory."'' Finally, the Court found that denying deductions for ex-
penses that the debtors do not actually incur furthers Congress's
intention to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum
amount they can afford.'37 As the debtor did not actually incur
any expenses for loan or lease payments on his vehicle, the Court
held that the debtor could not properly claim an expense for such
expenses on the means test.
The Fourth Circuit in Morris v. Quigley (In re Quigley)3' was
presented with a variation of the fact pattern presented in Hamil-
ton v. Lanning.14 ° The debtor listed two all-terrain vehicles
("ATVs") on her Schedule B and stated on her Schedule D that
the ATVs were collateral for promissory notes that she had exe-
cuted.14' The debtor accordingly listed the payments on the ATVs
as expense deductions when calculating her monthly disposable
income."' In her Chapter 13 plan, however, she indicated that she
would be surrendering both ATVs to the secured creditors and no
longer would be required to make the payments."3
The Chapter 13 trustee objected to the debtor's proposed plan,
alleging that the debtor had understated her disposable income
by improperly deducting, inter alia, the payments for the ATVs
when the debtor would in fact no longer be responsible for such
payments during the life of the plan.'44 Ruling prior to the deci-
sion in Lanning, the bankruptcy court overruled the trustee's ob-
jection on the grounds that projected disposable income was
based only on the expenses and income in the six months prior to
the petition date and that it was statutorily prohibited from con-
135. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 724 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 725.
137. Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 725 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005)).
138. Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 730.
139. 673 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 2012).
140. 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010).
141. In re Quigley, 673 F.3d at 270.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 271.
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sidering even known changes in the debtor's future expenses.15The district court affirmed. 146
Applying Lanning, which was released between the ruling in
the district court and the consideration of the case by the Fourth
Circuit, the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the district
court on the same rationale articulated by the Supreme Court.47
The Fourth Circuit held that a court may properly "account for
changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or vir-
tually certain at the time of confirmation."'4 The court also specif-
ically rejected the debtor's contention that the circumstances pre-
sented did not rise to the level of "exceptional" and that the
bankruptcy court was therefore within its rights to not take them
into account, as well as the contention that the sums involved
were not sufficient to warrant the court's consideration.49 As re-
moving the ATV payments from the disposable income calculation
would result in a two-thirds increase in the debtor's payments to
creditors, the court found that failing to correct for these pay-
ments would result in the very type of "senseless result" that the
Supreme Court sought to prevent in Lanning.1
5
0
In Johnson v. Zimmer, the Fourth Circuit considered how to
determine a Chapter 13 debtor's household size for purposes of
calculating the debtor's disposable income.' The debtor shared
custody of her two children with her former husband, the children
spending approximately 204 days per year at the debtor's resi-
dence. 2 The debtor's second husband, with whom she resided,
shared custody of his three children, who resided in the debtor's
residence approximately 180 days per year.1 3 The debtor applied
the "heads-on-beds" approach utilized by the United States Cen-
sus Bureau, counting "all the people who occupy a housing unit"
and listing a household size of seven."4 The debtor's former hus-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 274 (quoting Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. __, -' 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2475
(2012)).
148. Id. at 273 (quoting Lanning, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2478) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
149. Id. at 273-74 (quoting Lanning, 560 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2471).
150. Id. at 274 (quoting Lanning, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2475).
151. 686 F.3d 224, 225 (4th Cir. 2012).
152. Id. at 226.
153. Id. (footnote omitted).
154. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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band, who was also a creditor, subsequently objected to the debt-
or's Chapter 13 plan on the grounds that the debtor had miscalcu-
lated the household size and thus incorrectly calculated her
monthly disposable income.' 5
The bankruptcy court rejected the "heads-on-beds" method ap-
plied by the debtor in favor of a variation of the "economic unit"
approach, which assesses the number of individuals that act as a
"single economic unit" in a household. 16 In addition to full-time
residents, the court included part-time residents according to the
percentage of the year in which they reside in the household.57
Under this calculation, the debtor's two children who resided in
the household 204 days per year each constituted 0.56 members
of the household, while the debtor's three stepchildren who resid-
ed in the household 180 days per year each constituted 0.49
members."' This "fractional economic unit approach" resulted in
the debtor having 2.59 children in the household, which the court
rounded up to three.159 The court found that, as the debtor's cor-
rect household size was five persons, the plan could not be con-
firmed as proposed.
160
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy
court, finding that, as the Bankruptcy Code does not mandate a
particular method, the economic unit approach best effectuates
the intent and purpose of the code. 6' The court first expressly re-
jected the heads-on-beds test, finding that it is "wholly unrelated
to any bankruptcy purpose.""16 The court stated that, as the test
was developed simply to permit the Census Bureau to determine
the number of people in a geographic region, it does not "serve the
Code's objective of identifying a debtor's deductible monthly ex-
penses and, ultimately, his or her disposable income." '163 The eco-
nomic unit approach, in contrast, is "consistent with § 1325(b),
the BAPCPA, and the Code as a whole."'" The court specifically
155. Id.
156. Id. at 226-27 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 227.
158. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing In re Johnson, No. 10-072448-JRL, 2011 WL 5902883,
at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. July 21, 2011)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 227-28.
162. Id. at 236.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 237.
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noted the test's utility in examining the "financial interdepend-
ence of individuals to determine whether someone is an economic
part of the debtor's household," which the court defined as "those
the debtor financially supports and those who financially support
the debtor."16 The court further held that the economic unit ap-
proach is most consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Hamilton v. Lanning, as it recognizes that bankruptcy courts
should possess the flexibility to avoid a mechanical application of
the code in favor of an approach that permits courts to most accu-
rately approximate a debtor's household size, given the nuances
of a debtor's particular family situation.
VII. CLAIMS
A company in financial distress often is compelled to lay off
various parts of its workforce both before and after filing a bank-
ruptcy petition. Many companies implement severance benefit
plans for all or a portion of their employees in good times, and
they even do so in bad times in an attempt to prevent a mass exo-
dus of talented, operationally important employees at a time
when the company is struggling to keep the lights on. Unsurpris-
ingly, then, issues relating to employees' claims for severance
benefits occur frequently in corporate bankruptcy cases.
In bankruptcy, creditors receive distributions on their claims
according to the statutory order of priority set forth in § 507(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code.1 7 Fourth in priority are employee claims
(up to a capped amount for each employee) for "wages, salaries, or
commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay,"
that are earned within 180 days before the petition date.' In a
direct appeal arising out of LandAmerica's bankruptcy case, the
Fourth Circuit addressed whether, and to what extent, an em-
ployee's claim for severance benefits is entitled to priority under
§ 507(a)(4).' 6-
165. Id.
166. Id. at 242 (footnote omitted) (citing Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S . 130 S.
Ct. 2464, 2471-78 (2010)).
167. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
168. See id. § 507(a)(4).
169. Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir. 2011).
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The liquidating trustee in LandAmerica objected to more than
one hundred priority claims filed by employees for severance ben-
efits, arguing that the severance benefits were "earned" over the
entire course of the employees' employment because the sever-
ance plan at issue provided for different amounts of severance
pay based on the length of a given employee's employment and
that the amount eligible for priority should be prorated. 70 The
bankruptcy court rejected this argument and held that the sever-
ance benefits were earned on the date of termination, which in
this case occurred within 180 days before the petition date.17' The
liquidating trustee, with authorization from the bankruptcy
court, appealed directly to the Fourth Circuit."
In resolving just when severance benefits are "earned" within
the meaning of § 507(a)(4), the Fourth Circuit was compelled to
draw on dictionary definitions of "severance pay" and "earned"
because such terms are undefined in the Bankruptcy Code." 3 The
Fourth Circuit also highlighted the unique nature and purpose of
severance pay, as opposed to other forms of employee compensa-
tion:
The triggering events permitting employees to receive wages, sala-
ries, and commissions generally lie within the employees' control up-
on performance of their work, subject to the terms of the employ-
ment agreement....
In contrast to wages, salaries, and commissions, the triggering
events allowing employees to receive "severance pay" lie within the
employer's control and its decision both to provide severance com-
pensation and to terminate the employment relationship. Thus, em-
ployees do not "earn" "severance pay" in exchange for services ren-
dered as they do when they "earn" wages, salaries, and commissions.
Rather, employees receive "severance pay" as compensation for the
injury and losses resulting from the employer's decision to terminate
the employment relationship. This ordinary understanding of the
term "severance pay" is consistent with the stated purpose of the
plan in the present case, namely, to assist employees upon termina-
tion." 4
170. See id. at 407.
171. See id. at 407-08.
172. See id. at 406.
173. See id. at 408, 409 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
714 (2002); id. at 2081) (citing Scrimgeour v. Internal Revenue, 149 F.3d 318, 327 (4th Cir.
1989)).
174. See id.
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On that basis, the Fourth Circuit then concluded that "to be-
come entitled, represents the ordinary meaning of the manner in
which employees 'earn' 'severance pay,' within the intendment of
Congress .... [A]n employee 'earns' the full amount of 'severance
pay' on the date the employee becomes entitled to receive such
compensation . .. ,," This date typically will be the date on which
an employee is terminated, which in this case was within the 180-
day period before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and the
Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the bankruptcy court's deci-
sion.'76
VIII. CLASS ACTIONS
In Gentry v. Siegel, the Fourth Circuit addressed the means by
which a putative class of claimants may seek certification in a
bankruptcy court.177 Four former employees of Circuit City Stores,
Inc., filed proofs of claim asserting that each claim was filed for
the named claimant, and on behalf of other former employees
similarly situated.7 8 The bankruptcy court rejected these at-
tempts to certify classes of claimants, ruling that the claimants
were not authorized to file class proofs of claim: that the motion
under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 9014, to in-
corporate Rule 7023, regarding class actions, was untimely; that
the already-established bankruptcy claims resolution process
would be superior to the class action process for handling the
claims of potential class members; and that potential claimants
had received constitutionally adequate notice of the bankruptcy
proceedings and the applicable proof of claim deadlines. 9
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, but
ultimately agreed with the bankruptcy and district courts that
class certification was not warranted in this case. 80 The court
first held that claimants seeking class certification in a bankrupt-
cy proceeding may file a claim on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated claimants, as the claimants did here. 8' Howev-
175. See id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 410.
177. See 668 F.3d 83, 86, 90 (4th Cir. 2012).
178. Id. at 85.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 86.
181. Id. at 90.
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er, this claim only constitutes a proposal to represent the class,
which must then be approved by the bankruptcy court. 182 If ap-
proval subsequently is received, such approval relates back to the
time of filing.'8 3 Should approval be denied, the court required
that putative class members be given reasonable time to file indi-
vidual proofs of claim following such rejection. 8 4
The court then held that the claimants' motion under Rule
9014 to apply Rule 7023 was not untimely. 85 The court stated
that Rule 9014 applies only to contested matters, which do not
arise from a proof of claim until an objection to the claim has been
filed.' Here, the court found that the motion under Rule 9014
was filed shortly after the objection to the class proofs of claim
was filed and was therefore timely.'8 7
Having reversed the prior courts on these points, the court
then found that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion
in ruling that the bankruptcy claims resolution process was supe-
rior to the class action process in resolving the claims of putative
class members. 88 The court noted that the bankruptcy court pre-
viously had established an effective process for resolving large
numbers of claims and thus had determined that the addition of
several hundred potential class claims would not negatively im-
pact the claims resolution process. 88 The court finally held that as
no class had been certified, putative class members were not enti-
tled to the notice provisions contained in Rule 7023.' 9' The only
required notice was that giving notice of the bankruptcy proce-
dures and the claims bar date.' Accordingly, as the bankruptcy
court had considered the claimants' motion on the merits, the
court affirmed the ultimate decision of the lower courts. 192
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The court also noted that the requirement that putative class members be giv-
en the opportunity to file individual claims was not at issue because no unnamed claimant
had attempted, nor indicated any intent, to file an individual proof of claim. Id. at 91.
185. Id. at 92.
186. Id. (quoting Certified Class in Charter Sec. Litig. v. Charter Co. (In re Charter
Co.), 876 F.2d 866, 874-75 (11th Cir. 1989)).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 92-94 (internal citations omitted).
189. See id. at 93.
190. See id. at 94.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 95.
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Shortly after the Fourth Circuit's decision was released in Gen-
try v. Siegel, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia again was confronted with a substantially similar fact
pattern in In re Movie Gallery, Inc.'93 The claimant timely filed an
unsecured priority claim in the amount of "$10,950/class member"
for "wages, salaries, and compensation." '' The claim did not con-
tain a clear statement that it was being filed on behalf of a class,
but the claimant did attach a copy of a complaint filed in Califor-
nia state court seeking to pursue a class action against the debt-
or.9 Due to the vague nature of the claim, the liquidating trustee
did not become aware that the claimant considered his claim to be
on behalf of a class until approximately six months after the
debtor's Chapter 11 plan had been confirmed. 96 The claimant
filed a motion for an order applying Rule 7023 to his proof of
claim approximately two weeks prior to the scheduled hearing on
the trustee's objection to his claim.'97
The court noted that, while Gentry held that class claims may
be allowed in a bankruptcy case, such claims only should be al-
lowed "if doing so would produce 'a more practical and efficient
process for the adjudication of claims."'9 The court then found
that-given the advanced stage of the case, the fact that few
claims remained unresolved, and the fact that substantially all of
the debtor's hard assets had been liquidated-certification of a
class action would "serve only to throw the entire administration
of the case into chaos."'99 The claimants' motion therefore was de-
nied.0
IX. DISCHARGEABILITY
There are some debts a debtor cannot discharge in bankruptcy.
An example is a "debt. .. for a tax ... with respect to which a re-
turn, or equivalent report or notice, if required[,] was not filed or
193. See In re Movie Gallery, Inc., No. 10-30696-DOT, 2012 WL 909501, at *1 & nn.3-4
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) (footnotes omitted).
194. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. (footnote omitted).
196. Id. at *3.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *4 (quoting Gentry v. Siegel, 668 F.3d 83, 90 (4th Cir. 2012)).
199. Id. at *5.
200. Id.
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given.,,20 ' This reflects a legislative policy concern that the debt-
or's fresh start in bankruptcy should not be obtained at the ex-
pense of "the tax collector, who . . . has not had reasonable time to
collect" and that the discharge should not apply to tax claims "to
whose staleness the debtor contributed by some wrong-doing or
serious fault. 20 2
In Maryland v. Ciotti (In re Ciotti), the Fourth Circuit held that
a state's pre-petition tax claims were not discharged because the
debtor failed to file a required report with state taxing authori-
ties, the purpose of which was to notify state taxing authorities
that the IRS had adjusted the debtor's federal income .2 " Although
the debtor failed to file the report, the IRS separately notified the
state of the adjustment to the debtor's income, and the state, in
turn, made adjustments to the debtor's state returns, adding
more than $500,000 in taxes, penalties, and interest for the tax
years at issue."'
The Fourth Circuit held that the state's claims for these taxes
were not discharged because the 2005 BAPCPA amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code specifically added the failure to file an
'equivalent' . . 'report or notice' as a circumstance that will
cause a tax debt to be nondischargeable, and the report at issue
in Ciotti was the equivalent to a tax return."0 For instance, the
report was found to be similar to a tax return because submitting
false or misleading information in the report could lead to crimi-
nal liability under applicable state law, and one element of a tax
return is that it is submitted under penalty of perjury.0 6 In addi-
tion, the report satisfied the element of a tax return that it con-
tain sufficient data to compute tax liability because the report re-
quired the taxpayer to submit as an attachment to the report a
complete copy of the federal audit, including all exhibits°.2 7 The
201. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
202. Compare id., with S. REP. No. 95-989, at 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5800.
203. See 638 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2011).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 279, 280 (citing Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. 109-85, § 714, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(1)(B) (2006))).
206. See id. at 280 (citing MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 13-1204(a) (LexisNexis Repl.
Vol. 2010)).
207. See id. at 280-81 (quoting Maroney v. United States (In re Moroney), 352 F.2d
902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003); MD. CODE REGS. 03.04.02.11 (2012)).
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Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that the report was "given"
because the IRS separately informed state taxing authorities of
the adjustment to the debtor's income because the applicable
state statute provided that 'the person shall submit to the tax
collector a report of federal adjustment .... ,',208 For all of these
reasons, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the tax debt was not
discharged.01
Another type of debt not generally capable of being discharged
in a bankruptcy case is student loan debt. In order to discharge
student loan debt of a Chapter 13 debtor, the bankruptcy court
must find that failure to discharge the student loan debt would
impose an "undue hardship" on the debtor.21 In United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, the Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri to resolve a circuit split regarding whether a bankruptcy court
order entered in contravention of these rules is void.2 '
In Espinosa, a Chapter 13 debtor filed a proposed plan listing
only his student loan debt and proposing to repay the principal of
such debt, but providing for the discharge of all accrued interest
once the principal was repaid.2 The debtor did not comply with
the procedural requirement of initiating an adversary proceeding
to determine the dischargeability of a debt as set forth under
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 7001(6).13 However,
the creditor, United Student Aid Funds, Inc. ("United"), received
actual notice of the proposed plan and failed to object to the pro-
posed plan or appeal the bankruptcy court's order confirming the
plan."4 The bankruptcy court did not make any findings regard-
ing whether the student loan debt posed an undue hardship if it
were not discharged. Several years after the debtor completed his
plan payments and the bankruptcy court entered an order dis-
charging the debtor, United filed a motion under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(4), requesting that the bankruptcy
208. Id. at 281 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 13-409(b)).
209. Id.
210. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a)( 2 ) (2006 & Supp. IV. 2010).
211. 559 U.S. -, , 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2010).
212. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 1373, 1374 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at., 130 S. Ct. at 1373 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6), 7003, 7004, 7008).
214. Id. at __,130 S. Ct. at 1373.
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court set aside its order confirming the debtor's plan as a void
judgment.215
United argued that the confirmation order was void for two
reasons: first, the order was inconsistent with §§ 523(a)(8) and
1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 7001(6) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; second, United's due process
rights had been violated because the debtor did not initiate an
adversary proceeding by filing and serving a summons and com-
plaint as required by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
rules 7003, 7004, and 7008.216 The bankruptcy court rejected both
of these arguments and denied United's Rule 60 motion.217
On United's appeal, the district court reversed and held that
"United was denied due process because the confirmation order
was issued without service of the summons and complaint the
Bankruptcy Rules require." '18 Espinosa, the debtor, then appealed
to the Ninth Circuit and won.219 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
concluded that by confirming Espinosa's plan without first finding
undue hardship in an adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court
at most committed a legal error that United might have successfully
appealed, but that any such legal error was not a basis for setting
aside the confirmation order as void under Rule 60(b). 220
United then appealed to the Supreme Court,' which ruled
against United and upheld (for the most part) the Ninth Circuit's
decision.2
The Supreme Court first explained "that a void judgment is one
so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be
raised even after the judgment becomes final."' A judgment is
not void "simply because it is or may have been erroneous,''224 and
215. Id. at, 130 S. Ct. at 1374.
216. Id. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 1374-75 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1375.
218. Id. at, 130 S. Ct. at 1375.
219. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1375.
220. Id. at - 130 S. Ct. at 1375 (citing Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.,
553 F.3d 1193, 1198-1202 (9th Cir. 2008)) (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1376 (citing United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa,
557 U.S. -_, 129 S. Ct. 2791 (2009)).
222. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1378, 1382.
223. Id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 1377 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at -_, 130 S. Ct. at 1377 (quoting Hault v. Hault, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 12 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 60.44[1] [a], at 60-150 to 60-151 (3d ed. 2007)).
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"a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) is not a substitute for a timely ap-
peal. 2 25 Rather, Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from a judgment that
is "premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a
violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the op-
portunity to be heard."'226
In this case, the Supreme Court noted that United did not as-
sert that the confirmation order suffered from a jurisdictional de-
fect and explained that any such assertion would have failed in
any event because § 523(a)(8) (requiring a finding of undue hard-
ship before discharging student loan debt) and the applicable
bankruptcy rules (requiring the initiation of an adversary pro-
ceeding to determine the dischargeability of student loan debt)
are not jurisdictional.2 The Supreme Court rejected the notion
that United's due process rights were violated because "United
received actual notice of the filing and contents of Espinosa's
plan. This more than satisfied United's due process rights ....
Espinosa's failure to serve a summons and complaint does not en-
title United to relief under Rule 60(b)(4)." 28
The Supreme Court also rejected United's argument that the
confirmation order was void because it was entered in violation of
the Bankruptcy Code. 9 First, the Court held that
a failure to find undue hardship in accordance with § 523(a)(8) is
[not] on par with the jurisdictional and notice failings that define
void judgments .... Instead, § 523(a)(8) requires a court to make a
certain finding before confirming the discharge of a student loan
debt .... [This] does not mean that a bankruptcy court's failure to
make the finding renders its subsequent confirmation order
void ....0
The Court concluded that the bankruptcy court's failure to make
the required factual findings regarding undue hardship before
confirming Espinosa's plan "was a legal error ... [b]ut the order
remains enforceable and binding on United because United had
225. Id. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 1377 (citing Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1229
(8th Cir. 1997); MOORE ET AL., supra note 224, § 60.44[1] [a], at 60-150).
226. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1377 (citations omitted),
227. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1377-78 (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
515-16 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)).
228. Id. at 130 S. Ct. at 1378.
229. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 1380.
230. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 1379 (footnote omitted).
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notice of the error and failed to object or timely appeal."'' To this
extent, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion."
However, the Supreme Court specifically disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit's holding that "bankruptcy courts must confirm a
plan proposing the discharge of a student loan debt without a de-
termination of undue hardship in an adversary proceeding unless
the creditor timely raises a specific objection." '233 This was, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, "a step too far."' 4 Instead, the Court
held that it is "plain that bankruptcy courts have the authority-
indeed, the obligation-to direct a debtor to confirm his plan to
the requirements of §§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(8) .... [E]ven if the
creditor fails to object or appear in the adversary proceeding. 35
X. ETHICAL ISSUES
Legal ethics require particular attention in the bankruptcy
realm, as the Bankruptcy Code imposes heightened ethical duties
and conflict of interest rules in addition to any regulations enact-
ed by state bar organizations. In In re Pinebrook, LLC, the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia analyzed wheth-
er counsel for a debtor limited liability company was disinterested
under § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code when counsel had received
retainers from members of the debtor who were also creditors as
a result of loans made to the corporation.236 Pinebrook LLC was a
limited liability company whose members were also limited liabil-
ity companies.23 v Counsel for the debtor received retainers from
several of these member limited liability companies, none of
whom were in control of the debtor. 38 Several of the companies
that provided the retainers to counsel were also creditors by vir-
tue of loans made to the debtor prior to bankruptcy when no other
source of funding was available.239 The United States trustee
231. Id. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 1380.
232. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 1380.
233. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 1380 (citing Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.,
553 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008)).
234. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1380.
235. Id. at -_, 130 S. Ct. at 1381 (footnote and citation omitted).
236. 441 B.R. 67, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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sought to deny counsel's application for compensation on the
grounds that counsel was not disinterested under §§ 101(14) and
327(a) as a result of these retainers."'
The court held that counsel is not per se prohibited from receiv-
ing compensation from a creditor of the debtor.241 Under § 101(14)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which defines a disinterested person, a
party cannot hold an interest "materially adverse" to the estate or
any class of creditors or equity security holders.242 In setting this
"materially adverse" standard, the court explained that Congress
implicitly contemplated that some level of adversity may exist
without requiring disqualification.242 Accordingly, a court should
examine the "nexus between the creditor/guarantor making the
payment and the debtor itself."''4 Where the creditor paying the
fees also is controlling the debtor, and where the personal inter-
ests of the creditor likely are to be at odds with the debtor, courts
likely will find that counsel is not disinterested.246 The court noted
that the parties that provided the retainers at issue had no
means by which they could control the debtor or the debtor's
counsel and, therefore, found that the limited adversity that ex-
isted did not require the denial of compensation to the debtor's
counsel.24
In In re Lewis Road, LLC, however, the court was not so forgiv-
ing of such a conflict. '47 The sole assets of the debtor were two ad-
joining pieces of property that were encumbered by two liens held
by a bank and a limited liability company, respectively.24 After
the tenant leasing the property from the debtor elected not to re-
new its lease, the tenant and the debtor entered into a settlement
agreement to address damage and structural changes to the
property.249 Pursuant to this agreement, $74,549.18 was to be
paid to the junior lienholder to reimburse it for its attorneys' fees
240. Id.
241. Id. at 69.
242. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (2006).
243. In re Pinebrook, LLC, 441 B.R. at 69.
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. No. 09-37672, 2011 WL 6140747, at *14 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2011).
248. Id. at *1.
249. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
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and costs incurred in connection with the settlement."' The court
approved this settlement agreement pursuant to Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 9019.251
Several months after the settlement agreement was approved,
the United States trustee informed the court of a conflict between
counsel for the debtor and counsel for the junior lienholder.252 Not
only were respective counsel father and son, but they were also
members of the same law firm." 3 Counsel for the debtor argued
that the conflict was disclosed to the court in its application for
employment, that it had received a waiver of any potential con-
flict from both the debtor and the junior lienholder, and that he
did not feel that the conflict was problematic because '"everyone
was working together to achieve a positive resolution to [the]
matter."'2 4 The United States trustee then filed a motion under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), as made applicable
by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 9024, to amend
the settlement agreement to rescind approval of the junior
lienholder's attorneys fees and to require the disgorgement of
these funds to the estate.255
The court found the disclosure of the potential conflict in coun-
sel's application for employment to be grossly insufficient.2 6 Pur-
suant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 2014,
counsel was required to disclose any connections with the debtor,
creditors, or any other parties in interest. 5' Counsel's disclosure
simply stated that it had "connections with a creditor" and did not
elaborate further. 25 s The court further found that any purported
waiver of the conflict was ineffective without the approval of the
court, as counsel must independently satisfy the requirements of
§ 327. "Any waiver of the conflict required written notice to all
parties in interest in the case and the approval of the bankruptcy
250. Id. (citation omitted).
251. Id. (footnote omitted).
252. Id.
253. Id. at *2-3.
254. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
255. Id. at *, *5.
256. Id. at *9.
257. Id. at *6; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).
258. In re Lewis Road, LLC, 2011 WL 6140742, at *9.
259. Id. at *10 (citing In re Wynne Residential Asset Mgmt, LLC, 62 Collier Bankr.
Cas. 2d (MB) 1937, 1944 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2009)).
[Vol. 47:51
BANKRUPTCY LAW
court.""26 Having rejected the arguments of debtor's counsel, the
court granted the trustee's motion under Rule 60(b), found that
counsel's representation of the debtor violated the requirements
of § 327(a) and Rule 2014, and required that all moneys received
by counsel's firm in connection with the case be disgorged.261
XI. EXEMPTIONS
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, all of a debtor's assets be-
come "property of the estate" and subject to creditors' claims, ad-
ministration by the trustee, if one is appointed, and oversight by
the bankruptcy court.62 Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code au-
thorizes a debtor to exempt certain property from the estate with-
in statutorily defined limits.6 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure require a debtor to file a schedule of assets on the Offi-
cial Form titled "Schedule B" and a list of claimed exemptions on
the Official Form titled "Schedule C." '264 Under Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 4003(b), interested parties generally
must object to a debtor's claimed exemptions within thirty days
after conclusion of the meeting of creditors that must be held un-
der 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure, Rule 2003(a).265 Section 522(l) provides that "[u]nless a par-
ty in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list
is exempt.""26
In Schwab v. Reilly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
an appeal arising from a bankruptcy court decision in Pennsylva-
nia (within the Third Circuit) to resolve a circuit split regarding
an interested party's duty to object to a debtor's claimed exemp-
tion when a debtor lists the value of the exemption on Schedule C
260. Id. (citing In re Wynne Residential Asset Mgmt., LLC, 62 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d
(MB) at 1944).
261. Id. at *14 (citations omitted).
262. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006) ("[The] estate is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held. .. all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.").
263. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006).
264. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(1)(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a); 11 U.S.C. app. Of-
ficial Bankr. Form 6B (2006 & Supp, IV 2010); id. app. Official Bankr. Form 6C (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
265. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a).
266. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006).
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in an amount equivalent to the amount the debtor listed as the
asset's value on Schedule B.
2 7
Reilly in Schwab v. Reilly was a caterer who filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition and claimed an exemption in cooking and
other kitchen equipment that was worth $10,718, according to
her estimate of fair market value as of the petition date.268
Schwab, the Chapter 7 trustee in Reilly's bankruptcy case
charged with liquidating the debtor's assets for the benefit of
creditors, did not object to the claimed exemption within the
deadline because the amount Reilly claimed as exempt was with-
in the statutory limits. 269 However, an appraisal of the equip-
ment-performed before the objection deadline expired-revealed
that it was worth as much as $17,200.270 After the deadline to ob-
ject passed, Schwab moved for authority to auction the equipment
and distribute $10,718 to Reilly on account of her exemption but
distribute the remainder to Reilly's creditors.271 Reilly objected
and argued that
by equating on Schedule C the total value of the exemptions she
claimed in the equipment with the equipment's estimated market
value [i.e., the value Reilly had scheduled on Schedule B as the value
of the equipment], she had put Schwab and her creditors on notice
that she intended to exempt the equipment's full value, even if that
amount turned out to be more than the dollar amount she declared,
and more than the Code allowed.
272
Thus, according to Reilly, Schwab should have, but did not, ob-
ject to her exemption in time, and the full value of the equipment
was exempt.2 73 Reilly asserted that her sentimental attachment to
the equipment, which was purchased for Reilly by her parents,
was so great that she would dismiss her bankruptcy case before
allowing the equipment to be sold at auction. 74 The bankruptcy
court agreed with Reilly and denied Schwab's motion to auction
267. See 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2010).
268. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2657 (citations omitted).
269. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2658 (citations omitted).
270. Id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2658 (footnote omitted).
271. Id. at 130 S. Ct. at 2658 (citation omitted).
272. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2658 (citation omitted).
273. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2658 (citation omitted).
274. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2658. Reilly, in fact, filed a conditional motion to dismiss
her case in the event the bankruptcy court granted Schwab's motion to auction the equip-
ment. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2659 (citing In re Reilly, 403 B.R. 336 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
2006)).
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the equipment, and thereafter, both the district court and the
Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling against
Schwab on appeal.275
In ruling against Schwab, the Third Circuit construed the Su-
preme Court's prior decision in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz276 to
stand for the "unstated premise ... that a debtor who exempts
the entire reported value of an asset is claiming the full amount,
whatever it turns out to be., 277 The result of the Third Circuit's
decision was that Reilly was granted "the equivalent of an in-kind
interest in her business equipment, even though the value of that
exemption exceeded the amount that Reilly declared on Schedule
C and the amount that the Code allowed her to withdraw from
the bankruptcy estate. 278
Reilly argued on appeal that "where, as here, a debtor equates
the total value of her claimed exemptions in a certain asset...
with her estimate of the asset's market value ... she establishes
the 'property claimed as exempt' as the full value of the asset,
whatever that turns out to be." 271 Schwab did not dispute that the
way Reilly filled out schedules B and C put him on notice
that Reilly "equated the total value of her claimed exemptions in
the equipment ... with the equipment's market value.""28
Schwab's essential argument on appeal was that such 'identical
275. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2659 (citing In re Reilly, 403 B.R. 336; In re Reilly, 534
F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2008)).
276. 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) (finding important that the debtor had listed "unknown"
for both the value of the asset and the value of the claimed exemption with respect to
whether interested parties were on notice for objection purposes of the debtor's intent to
exempt the full value of the property).
277. In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 179 (quoting Allen v. Green (In re Green), 31 F.3d 1098,
1100 (11th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court repudiated
such an interpretation of Taylor, explaining first that "[ijn Taylor, the question concerned
a trustee's obligation to object to the debtor's entry of a 'value claimed exempt' that was
not plainly within the limits the Code allows. In this case, the opposite is true." Schwaab,
560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2666. The Supreme Court then clarified that Taylor does not
rest on what the Third Circuit described as an "unstated premise:"
Taylor does not rest on this premise. It establishes and applies the straight-
forward proposition that an interested party must object to a claimed exemp-
tion if the amount the debtor lists as the "value claimed exempt" is not within
statutory limits, a test the value ($ unknown) in Taylor failed, and the values
($8,868 and $1,850) in this case pass.
Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2666.
278. Schwaab, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2659 (citing In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 178-
79).
279. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2661 (citation omitted).
280. Id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2661.
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listing [did not] put [him] on notice that Reilly intended to ex-
empt the property fully,' regardless whether its value exceeded
the exemption limits the code prescribes.""" Schwab premised his
argument on his contention that "the Code defines the 'property'
Reilly claimed as exempt under § 522(o as an 'interest' whose
value cannot exceed a certain dollar amount." '282 Viewing Reilly's
schedules in light of these Code provisions, Schwab asserted "that
Reilly's claimed exemption was facially unobjectionable because
the 'property claimed as exempt' (i.e., two interests in her busi-
ness equipment worth $8,868 and $1,850, respectively) is proper-
ty Reilly was clearly entitled to exclude from her estate under the
Code provisions she referenced [in Schedule C]." 283
The Supreme Court agreed with Schwab's statutory interpreta-
tion and, in a passage that reveals how the Supreme Court ap-
proaches statutory construction issues under the Bankruptcy
Code, carefully paraded through § 522 to explain its reasoning:
The portion of § 522(l) that resolves this case is not, as Reilly asserts,
the provision stating that the "property claimed as exempt on
[Schedule C] is exempt" unless an interested party objects. Rather, it
is the portion of § 522(l) that defines the target of the objection,
namely, the portion that says Schwab has a duty to object to the "list
of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b)."
That subsection, § 522(b), does not define the "property claimed as
exempt" by reference to the estimated market value on which Reilly
and the Court of Appeals rely. Section 522(b) refers only to property
defined in § 522(d), which in turn lists 12 categories of property that
a debtor may claim as exempt. As we have recognized, most of these
categories (and all of the categories applicable to Reilly's exemptions)
define the "property" a debtor may "clai[m] as exempt" as the debt-
or's "interest"-up to a specified dollar amount-in the assets de-
scribed in the category, not as the assets themselves. Viewing Reil-
ly's form entries in light of this definition, we agree.., that Schwab
had no duty to object to the property Reilly claimed as exempt (two
interests in her business equipment worth $1,850 and $8,868) be-
cause the stated value of each interest, and thus of the "property
claimed as exempt," was within the limits the Code allows .... The
Court of Appeals' contrary holding not only fails to account for the
Code's definition of the "property claimed as exempt." It also fails to
account for the provisions in § 522(d) that permit debtors to exempt
certain property in kind or in full regardless of value. We decline to
281. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2661 (quoting In re Reilly, 534 F.3d at 178) (second altera-
tion in original).
282. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2661 (citations omitted).
283. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2661 (citations omitted).
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construe Reilly's claimed exemptions in a manner that elides the dis-
tinction between these provisions and provisions such as [those that
govern Reilly's exemptions in the equipment], particularly based up-
on an entry on Schedule C-Reilly's estimate of her equipment's
market value-to which the Code does not refer in defining the
"property claimed as exempt. 2 4
The Supreme Court sided with Schwab and rejected Reilly's
arguments because such arguments defined "the target of a trus-
tee's objection-the 'property claimed as exempt'-based on lan-
guage in Schedule C and dictionary definitions of 'property,' that
the definition in the Code itself overrides.""2 The Court also sided
with Schwab on policy grounds:
We agree that "exemptions in bankruptcy cases are part and parcel
of the fundamental bankruptcy concept of a 'fresh start."' We disa-
gree that this policy required Schwab to object to a facially valid
claim of exemption on pain of forfeiting his ability to preserve for the
estate any value in Reilly's business equipment beyond the value of
the interest she declared exempt. This approach threatens to convert
a fresh start into a free pass.
The majority opinion ended with an instruction guide for debtors
who wish to exempt the full fair market value of an asset:
Where, as here, it is important to the debtor to exempt the full mar-
ket value of the asset or the asset itself, our decision will encourage
the debtor to declare the value of her claimed exemption in a manner
that makes the scope of the exemption clear, for example, by listing
the exempt value as "full fair market value (FMV)" or "100% of
FMV." Such a declaration will encourage the trustee to object
promptly to the exemption if he wishes to challenge it and preserve
for the estate any value in the asset beyond relevant statutory lim-
its. If the trustee fails to object, or if the trustee objects and the ob-
jection is overruled, the debtor will be entitled to exclude the full
value of the asset. If the trustee objects and the objection is sus-
tained, the debtor will be required either to forfeit the portion of the
exemption that exceeds the statutory allowance, or to revise other
exemptions or arrangements with her creditors to permit the exemp-
tion.
The ultimate outcome in Schwab-that an interested party
need not object to facially valid exemptions-is consistent with
the dissent's admonishment that "forms, rules, treatise excerpts,
284. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2661-63 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
285. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2662 (internal footnote and citation omitted).
286. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 2667 (internal citations omitted).
287. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 2668 (internal footnotes and citation omitted).
20121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
and policy considerations ... must be read in light of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions that govern this case, and must yield to
those provisions in the event of conflict.
'
"
2 8
8
XII. FINAL ORDERS
In McDow v. Dudley, the Fourth Circuit held that an order
denying a motion to dismiss a debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case
as abusive under § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a final and
appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). 9 In Dudley, the debt-
ors filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which they subsequently converted to a case under Chapter 7.29o
The United States trustee then filed a motion to dismiss the
Chapter 7 case under § 707(b), asserting that the debtors failed to
meet the requirements of the means test under § 707(b)(2) and
that the debtors' financial circumstances indicated that they had
the ability to repay their creditors under § 707(b)(3).2 9 ' The bank-
ruptcy court denied the trustee's motion to dismiss the case.292
The trustee appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling to the district
court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter juris-
diction holding that the order was not "final" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).2 3
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the
appeal.2 94 The court noted that "the concept of finality in bank-
ruptcy cases has traditionally been applied in a more pragmatic
and less technical way ... than in other situations." '295 The court
explained that, "because of the special nature of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, which often involve multiple parties, claims, and proce-
dures," postponing the review of rulings on discrete issues could
waste significant time and judicial resources. 296 Therefore, "'or-
288. Id. at__, 130 S. Ct. at 2660 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
289. 662 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2011).
290. Id. at 285.
291. Id. at 285-86.
292. Id. at 286 (citing McDow v. Dudley (In re Dudley), 405 B.R. 790, 801 (W.D. Va.
2009)).
293. Id. (citing McDow v. Dudley, 428 B.R. 686, 688-89 (W.D. Va. 2010)).
294. Id. at 285.
295. Id. at 287 (quoting Gold v. Guberman (In re Computer Learning Ctrs. Inc.), 407
F.3d 656, 660 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted)).
296. Id. at 287 (citing A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1009 (4th Cir. 1986);
Bourns v. Northwood Props., LLC, 509 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2007)).
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ders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately appealed if they fi-
nally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.' 297
The court then held that orders denying motions to dismiss un-
der § 707(b) constitute orders disposing of just such a discrete is-
sue. 8 The court distinguished motions to dismiss under § 707(b)
from motions to dismiss under other provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code, noting the relatively short time frame within which a mo-
tion to dismiss under this section must be filed.29 Under § 704(b),
the United States trustee must review whether a Chapter 7 case
is abusive as a mandatory threshold question in every case filed
under Chapter 7 and must then file a statement regarding his
conclusion within ten days of the meeting of creditors. 00 Other
motions to dismiss, in contrast, such as certain motions under
§ 1112(b) or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), may be
brought throughout the bankruptcy case.0 1 Given these timelines,
the court found that a trustee's motion to dismiss under § 707(b)
constitutes a discrete dispute that is finally resolved when a
bankruptcy court denies the trustee's motion, thus rendering the
court's order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 2
XIII. STERN V. MARSHALL-POWERS OF THE COURT
By far, the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Stern v. Mar-
shall0 3 (authored by Chief Justice Roberts) has garnered more at-
tention from the bankruptcy bench and bar than any other deci-
sion from any court in recent years.04 This is because Stern
marks the first time in the past thirty years that the Supreme
Court has addressed the constitutionality of the bankruptcy judi-
cial system in the United States, and the Supreme Court's Stern
decision, some might argue, drastically limits a bankruptcy
297. Id. (citing In re Computer Learning Ctrs. Inc., 407 F.3d at 660).
298. Id. at 290.
299. Id. at 289.
300. Id. at 288 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
301. See id. at 289.
302. Id.
303. 564 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
304. See Katie Drell Grissel, Stern v. Marshall-Digging for Gold and Shaking the
Foundation of Bankruptcy Courts (or Not), 72 LA. L. REV. 647, 648 (2012).
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judge's constitutional authority to adjudicate causes of action the
debtor may have against creditors or other parties."'
The procedural history of Stern, which arose from the bank-
ruptcy case of Anna Nicole Smith, is quite complicated-in fact,
the Supreme Court likened it to the Jarndyce suit in Charles
Dickens's Bleak House."' It suffices to understand that Anna Ni-
cole filed a bankruptcy petition in California; the son of Anna Ni-
cole's late husband filed a complaint and proof of claim in Anna
Nicole's bankruptcy case asserting that Anna Nicole and her law-
yers had defamed him; and Anna Nicole filed a counterclaim
against the son for tortious interference, alleging that the son
fraudulently induced Anna Nicole's late husband (one of the rich-
est men in Texas) to exclude Anna Nicole from his living trust
and will."' Though Stern involves other interesting issues, the
most noteworthy issue in Stern was whether the bankruptcy
court had statutory and constitutional authority to enter a final
judgment on Anna Nicole's counterclaim. 8
With regard to the bankruptcy court's statutory authority, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether Anna Nicole's counterclaim
was a "core" matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157, which authorizes dis-
trict courts to refer bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy courts and
authorizes a bankruptcy court to enter final judgments on "core"
matters and to submit proposed findings and conclusions to the
district court on non-core matters. Because Anna Nicole's coun-
terclaim was a "counterclaimo by the estate against persons fil-
ing claims against the estate," it was a "core" proceeding under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).31° The son argued that the bankruptcy court
nonetheless was not statutorily authorized to enter a final judg-
ment on Anna Nicole's counterclaim because 28 U.S.C. § 157
could be read to allow "a bankruptcy judge [to] enter a final
judgment on a core proceeding only if that proceeding also
305. See Med. Educ. & Health Servs., Inc. v. Indep. Mayaguez (In re Med. Educ. &
Health Servs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 527, 548 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011).
306. Stern, 564 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Charles Dickens, Bleak House, in
1 WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 4-5 (1891)).
307. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2601 (citations omitted).
308. See id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2604-05, 2608.
309. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2603, 2604 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1), (2)(C), (2006))
(footnote omitted).
310. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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'aris[es] in' a Title 11 case or 'aris[es] under' Title 11 itself."'1 The
Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that there is no
such thing as a core matter that neither arises under Title 11 nor
arises in a case under a Title 11 of the United States Code, which
was the erroneous assumption underpinning the son's interpreta-
tion of 28 U.S.C. § 157. 3' 2 Rather, the Supreme Court explained
that a core matter must be an "arising" proceeding."1
Although the Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court
had statutory authority over Anna Nicole's counterclaim, it none-
theless held that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional au-
thority over the counterclaim under separation of powers princi-
ples.314 The Supreme Court started its constitutional analysis by
explaining that Article III, Section 1 of the United States Consti-
tution provides that the 'judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.'
'1 1
The judges of Article III courts "'shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior' and 'receive for their Serviceso a Compensation[]
[that] shall not be diminished' during their tenure."3'1 The Su-
preme Court further explained that
[U]nder "the basic concept of separation of powers ... that flow[s]
from the scheme of a tripartite government" adopted in the Constitu-
tion, "the 'judicial power of the United States'... can no more be
shared" with another branch than "the Chief Executive, for example,
can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share
with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto."
3 17
Applying separation of powers principles, the Supreme Court
held that the bankruptcy court's exercise of "judicial power" over
Anna Nicole's counterclaim was unconstitutional because, among
other reasons, a bankruptcy judge is not an Article III judge-
311. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2604 (second and third alterations in original).
312. See id. at -. , 131 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
313. Id. at __ 131 S. Ct. at 2605 ("[C]ore proceedings are those that arise in a bank-
ruptcy case or under Title 11.").
314. See id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (plurality opinion); U.S. Const. art. III).
315. See id. at __ 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (citation omitted).
316. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
317. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704
(1974)) (alterations in original).
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bankruptcy judges "enjoy neither tenure during good behavior
nor salary protection." '18 The Supreme Court ultimately held that
Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the
United States may be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the
protections set forth in that Article. We conclude today that Con-
gress, in one isolated respect, exceeded that limitation in the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1984. The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitu-
tional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a credi-
tor's proof of claim. 19
Bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts continue to grapple
with Stern's impact, and clear consensus on Stern's reach has not
yet emerged.
XIV. LIENS AND SECURITY INTERESTS
In SunTrust Bank, N.A. v. Macky (In re McCormick), the
Fourth Circuit addressed the strong arm powers of a bankruptcy
trustee under § 544.320 The debtors owned two contiguous tracts of
land ("Tract I" and "Tract II"), on which SunTrust held deeds of
trust."1 While SunTrust properly recorded its lien on Tract II in
the Parcel Identifier Number ("PIN"') Index used as the official
real property recording index in Orange County, North Carolina,
it failed to properly record its lien on Tract .322 The bankruptcy
trustee sought to avoid the lien held by SunTrust on Tract I un-
der § 544(a)(3) because a search of the index on the petition date
would not have disclosed the existence of SunTrust's lien as the
lien had not been properly recorded on the PIN Index. 23 SunTrust
argued that the trustee had constructive knowledge of the lien
because a competent title searcher would have reviewed the deed
of trust on Tract II and found reference to SunTrust's lien on
Tract I and would have found reference to the lien on Tract I in
the unofficial grantor/grantee index also maintained by Orange
County.324
318. See id. at __ 131 S. Ct. at 2601, 2608.
319. See id. at, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
320. See 669 F.3d 177, 178 (4th Cir. 2012).
321. Id.
322, Id. at 179.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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The court held that, under § 544(a)(3), the trustee's ability to
avoid the lien is determined by whether "a bona fide purchaser of
the property would have taken the property subject to the lien"
under state law.32 5 A trustee, therefore, is imputed only with the
knowledge of a bona fide purchaser under state law without re-
gard to any actual knowledge of the trustee.326 Analyzing North
Carolina's recording system, the court concluded that under
North Carolina law, if a prior lien is not recorded properly, a sub-
sequent purchaser can take the property as if no lien exists even
if the purchaser has actual knowledge that an earlier lien has
been created.2 7 The Court thus held that any constructive
knowledge held by the trustee was irrelevant.2 As the lien was
not properly recorded on the PIN Index, under North Carolina
law the trustee's status as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser
permitted him to avoid SunTrust's lien.25
In Botkin v. DuPont Community Credit Union, the debtor
owned residential property with a market value of $22,500 sub-
ject to a purchase money deed of trust in the amount of $24,124
and a judicial lien in the amount of $9800."' Although the debtor
had $2777 in remaining homestead exemptions under Virginia
Code section 34-14, she did not claim a homestead exemption for
any portion of her real property.331 The debtor filed a motion to
avoid the judicial lien under § 522(f).332 The bankruptcy court de-
nied the debtor's motion on the ground that the debtor must ac-
tually claim an exemption to avoid a judicial lien under § 522(f). 33
On appeal, the district court reversed the decision of the bank-
ruptcy court, holding that the debtor need not actually claim an
exemption to utilize § 522(f). 4 The judicial lien creditor, DuPont
Community Credit Union, appealed the district court's reversal to
the Fourth Circuit.3Y5
325. Id. at 180 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2006)).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 181, 182 (quoting Hill v. Pinelawn Mem'I Park, Inc., 282 S.E.2d 779, 782
(N.C. 1981); Turner v. Glenn, 18 S.E.2d 197, 201 (N.C. 1942)).
328. See id. at 183.
329. Id. at 184.
330. 650 F.3d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 2011).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 398.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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Section 522 provides that a "debtor may avoid the fixing of a
[judicial] lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the ex-
tent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled." ' 6 A lien impairs an exemption
to the extent that the sum of (i) the lien; (ii) all other liens on the
property; and (iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could
claim if there were no liens on the property; exceeds the value that
the debtor's interest in the property would have in the absence of
any liens. 37
Dupont conceded that this mathematical test set forth in
§ 522(f)(2) was satisfied.338
Analyzing the plain language of the statute, the court affirmed
the ruling of the district court that a debtor need not actually
claim an exemption to avail itself of § 522(f). 3 ' The court noted
that the language of § 522(f)(2) refers to 'the amount of the ex-
emption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the
property... [thus reflecting] § 522's focus not on any actual claim
of exemption, but rather on the hypothetical exemption that the
debtor would have been entitled to in the absence of the lien.'
340
Accordingly, debtors do not need to claim an exemption as a pre-
condition of avoiding a lien under § 522(f). '4
The court in Pierce v. New Generations Federal Credit Union
(In re Pierce) addressed whether Chapter 13 debtors may strip off
a lien that had been treated as fully secured in the debtors con-
firmed plan.4 ' The debtors' real property was encumbered by two
liens held by Bank of America and New Generations Federal
Credit Union, respectively.343 The debtors' confirmed plan elected
to treat both liens as fully secured." ' After confirmation, however,
the debtors filed an adversary proceeding seeking to strip off the
second priority lien held by New Generations."
336. Id. at 397-98 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(0)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)).
337. Id. at 399 (citing 11 U.S.C.A.§ 522(f)(2)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010)).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 400.
340. Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted).
341. Id.
342. Nos. 10-35404-KRH, APN 11-03288-KRH, 2012 WL 1903263, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.
Va., May 24, 2012).
343. Id.
344. Id. at *3.
345. Id. at *1.
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While finding that the amount of the first lien exceeded the
value of the debtors' property and that New Generations' lien
therefore was completely unsecured, the court nevertheless dis-
missed the debtors' adversary proceeding because the confirmed
Chapter 13 plan did not propose to modify New Generations'
lien."6 The court held that while § 506(d) provides that a lien is
void to the extent that it does not secure a claim against a debtor
that is an allowed secured claim, this section is not self-
executing.47 Rather, the authority to avoid a lien comes through §
1322(b)(2) and the plan confirmation process.348 The court thus
found that a debtor only may pursue an adversary proceeding to
avoid a lien after confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan allowing for
the modification.349 Additionally, the court held that the Chapter
13 plan's treatment of New Generations' claim as fully secured
had res judicata effect that prevented the modification of the
lien."' Finding that plan confirmation was a final judgment bind-
ing both the debtors and New Generations to the terms of the
plan, the court concluded that the debtors could not initiate an
adversary proceeding to strip the lien unless the debtors first
proposed to do so in a modified plan.t
In In re Nguyen, a creditor opposed the debtor's attempts to
avoid a judgment lien pursuant to § 522(f) on the ground that the
debtor did not have equity in the property, citing the case of In re
Sheaffer." The court rejected this argument, holding that the
1994 amendment to § 522(f), which added the mathematical for-
mula for calculating whether a lien would impair an exemption to
which the debtor would be entitled, was specifically enacted to
permit a debtor to avoid a judicial lien on property in which the
346. Id. at *1, *3, *4 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992); Ryan v.
Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 2001)).
347. Id. at *3.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (citations omitted).
351. Id.
352. No. 11-15308-BFK, 2011 WL 4915884, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2011) (citing
Sheaffer v. Marshall Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sheaffer), 159 B.R. 758, 760 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1993), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, 108 Stat. 22).
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debtor lacks equity.53 The earlier decision in In re Sheaffer was
thus overruled and is no longer applicable.1
54
In Peterson v. United BankShares, Inc. (In re Peterson), the
Chapter 13 debtor sought to strip off a second priority lien on the
debtor's primary residence held by United Bank, alleging that
there was no equity in the property to which the lien could at-
tach.5 While the parties agreed that the balance of the first lien
was $864,395.35, they disagreed with respect to the value of the
property. 56 After weighing the valuation evidence presented by
both parties, the court determined that the property had a value
of $880,000 and, thus, that the debtor had approximately $15,600
equity in the property.
3 5 7
The court noted that while a debtor may avoid a lien on proper-
ty that is not supported by any equity, § 1322(b)(2) prohibits a
court from modifying the rights of a creditor secured by a security
interest in the debtor's principal residence.358 This prohibition in-
cludes bifurcating a partially secured claim into secured and un-
secured components. 359 Accordingly, the court held that "a deed of
trust that is supported by even $1.00 of equity cannot be modi-
fied. 3
60
In Radlax Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, the Su-
preme Court was called upon to determine whether a debtor may
cram down a Chapter 11 plan that proposes to sell free and clear
the encumbered assets of a secured creditor without giving the
creditor a right to credit bid.6 ' The debtors, owner of the Radisson
Hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport, filed a Chapter 11
plan proposing to dissolve and to sell substantially all of its assets
through an auction.6 2 The plan also provided that the secured
creditor could not use its debt to offset the purchase price and
353. Id. at *1-2 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 52-54 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3361-62).
354. See id. at *2-5.
355. 64 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1667, 1667 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
356. Id. at 1668.
357. Id. at 1670-71.
358. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006); Nobelman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324
(1993)).
359. Id. at 1670 (citing 11 U.SC. § 1322(b)(2); Nobleman, 508 U.S. 432).
360. Id. at 1671.
361. 566 U.S. -,... 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2068 (2012).
362. Id. at __ 132 S. Ct. at 2068, 2069.
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must pay cash should it wish to bid on its assets.6 3 The debtors
sought to confirm this plan over the secured creditor's objection
under § 1129(b)(2)(A)." 4
Under § 1129(b)(2)(A), a plan is "fair and equitable" with re-
spect to a dissenting secured creditor if the plan provides that: (i)
the creditor either retains its lien and receives deferred cash
payments totaling at least the allowed amount of its claim; (ii) the
property is sold free and clear of the creditor's lien with the credi-
tor to receive a replacement lien on the proceeds of the sale, sub-
ject to the creditor's right to credit bid set forth in § 363(k); or (iii)
the creditor will realize the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.6 5
The debtors sought to confirm the plan under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii),
asserting that the creditor would receive the "indubitable equiva-
lent" of its claim in the form of cash generated by the auction.366
The Court held that the debtors' plan must permit the creditor
the right to credit bid at the sale of its encumbered assets.6 The
Court stated that well-established principles of statutory inter-
pretation hold "that the specific governs the general," particularly
where "Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has
deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions.""36
Looking at the statute in question, the court found that "clause
(ii) is a detailed provision that spells out the requirements for
selling collateral free of liens, while clause (iii) is a broadly word-
ed provision that says nothing about such a sale." ' Although
clause (iii) may be broad enough to include the issue at hand,
clause (iii) 'will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt
with' in clause (i). 37° Accordingly, as clause (ii) squarely address-
es plans under which the property is sold free and clear of a credi-
363. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2069. Offsetting one's debt against the purchase price of
such property is known as "credit bidding." Id. at -. , 132 S. Ct. at 2069.
364. Id. at__, 132 S. Ct. at 2069.
365. Id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 2070 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A) (2006)).
366. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2070 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. Id. at__, 132 S. Ct. at 2073.
368. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe,
516 U.S. 489, 519 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
369. Id. at__, 132 S. Ct. at 2071.
370. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2071-72 (quoting D. Ginsburg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285
U.S. 204, 208 (1932)).
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tor's lien, the debtor may not apply the catchall provision in
clause (iii) to deny the creditor the right to credit bid.37'
The debtors in In re Martin owned residential real property
with a value of $62,052.60 subject to a claim in the amount of
$132,429.97 secured by a deed of trust on both the real property
and the debtor's interest in an escrow account. 7 ' Asserting that
the anti-modification provisions of § 1322(b)(2) did not apply be-
cause the debtors' property was secured by an interest in both
their primary residence and the escrow account, the debtors filed
a Chapter 13 plan seeking to bifurcate the secured loan, to
reamortize $2527.17 in pre-petition mortgage arrears, and to
reamortize the secured portion of the loan over a term of 108
months at 3.5 percent interest.373
The court found that the secured creditor's lien on the debtors'
interest in the escrow account caused the claim to not be "secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence," and that the anti-modification provision of
§ 1322(b)(2) did not apply.374 The court nevertheless denied con-
firmation of the debtors' plan.37 ' While the debtors could bifurcate
the secured creditor's claim, the debtors only could extend pay-
ments on the secured portion of the claim beyond the life of the
plan if the plan provided for the curing of any default within a
reasonable time and the maintenance of payments while the case
was pending.37 The debtors' proposed plan sought to cure the de-
fault by reamortizing the pre-petition arrearage over 108 months,
which the court concluded was not within a reasonable time. 77
The court further held that if the debtors sought to modify the
terms of the loan with the secured creditor, the full amount of the
secured portion of the loan must be paid over the life of the
plan. 7' Should the debtors seek to extend payments of the se-
371. Id. at-_, 132 S. Ct. at 2072.
372. 444 B.R. 538, 541-42 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 543 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
375. See id.
376. Id. at 543-44 (citing In re Plourde, 402 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009); In re
Veliz, No. 08-13292, 2009 WL 3418638, at *1 (Bankr. D.R.I. Oct. 16, 2009)).
377. Id. at 542, 543.
378. Id. (citing In re Hayes, No. 10-81248C-13D, 2011 WL 249450 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
Jan. 24, 2011); In re Valdes, No. 09-26712-BKC-AJC, 2010 WL 3956814, at *4 (Bankr. S.D,
Fla. Oct. 4, 2010); In re Plourde, 402 B.R. at 491; In re McGregor, 172 B.R. 718, 721
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cured debt past the conclusion of the plan, the debtors would have
to do so with the terms and interest rate set forth in the original
mortgage agreement. 37 9
XV. NON-DEBTOR RELEASES
Chapter 11 debtors and their professionals, officers, directors,
and affiliates often seek a release of liability in any proposed
Chapter 11 plan-these releases are referred to as "non-debtor re-
leases." The Fourth Circuit had occasion in Behrmann v. National
Heritage Foundation, Inc., to confirm that non-debtor releases are
not per se impermissible under the Bankruptcy Code (although
such releases "should be granted cautiously and infrequently")
and to provide guidance to bankruptcy and district courts regard-
ing the standards for approval of such non-debtor releases.Y
The Fourth Circuit first reaffirmed its prior decision arising
out of the A.H. Robins bankruptcy case (which resulted from A.H.
Robins's mass tort liability for the Dalkon Shield contraception
device) approving non-debtor releases under § 524(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: "[W]e have rejected the notion that 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(e) forecloses bankruptcy courts from releasing and enjoin-
ing causes of action against nondebtors .... [In A.H. Robins,] we
permitted the bankruptcy court to enjoin [suits against nondebt-
ors] on grounds of equity."' 81 Next, the court explained that
a bankruptcy court need not find a precise fit between the circum-
stances found in A.H. Robins and the case before it as a precondition
to granting equitable relief. Rather, whether a court should lend its
aid in equity to a Chapter 11 debtor will turn on the particular facts
and circumstances of the case ....382
To aid bankruptcy and district courts in evaluating whether the
facts and circumstances of a given case supported approval of
non-debtor releases, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the standards
(Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 21, 1994)) (footnote omitted).
379. Id. (citing in re Veliz, 2009 WL 3418638, at *1).
380. 663 F.3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber
Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2005);
Lacy v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 657-58 (6th Cir.
2002); Gillman v. Cont'l Airlines (In re Cont'l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 212-13 (3d Cir.
2000)).
381. id. at 710 (citing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 850 F.2d 694,
701 (4th Cir 1989) (conferring equitable powers on court)).
382. ld.at7ll.
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set forth in two other decisions: the Sixth Circuit's decision in In
re Dow Corning Corp.383 and the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Maryland's decision in In re Railworks Corp.14 The Fourth Cir-
cuit explained that "we are satisfied to leave to a bankruptcy
court the determination of which factors may be relevant in a
specific case . . . .""' However, the Fourth Circuit admonished
bankruptcy and district courts that they must "make specific fac-
tual findings in support of [the] decision to grant equitable re-
lief."'386 In National Heritage, the bankruptcy court had not made
sufficient factual findings, and the Fourth Circuit remanded for
the bankruptcy court to make additional findings. 7
XVI. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A big issue for consumer debtors is what will happen to their
vehicles if they file bankruptcy. The Fourth Circuit in Daim-
lerChrysler Financial Services Americas, LLC v. Jones (In re
Jones),"'s clarified this issue, at least with respect to the proce-
383. Id. at 711-12 (quoting In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658). The Dow Corn-
ing factors are:
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party,
usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is,
in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate;
(2) The non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization;
(3) The injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the reorganization
hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who would
have indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor; (4) The impacted
class, or classes, has overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan; (5) The plan
provides a mechanism to pay for all, or substantially all, of the class or clas-
ses affected by the injunction; (6) The plan provides an opportunity for those
claimants who choose not to settle to recover in full and; (7) The bankruptcy
court made a record of specific factual findings that support its conclusions.
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (citing In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 7901-02;
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 92-94 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Cont'l
Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214).
384. Nat'l Heritage Found. Inc., 663 F.3d at 712 (citing Hoge v. Moore (In re Railworks
Corp.), 345 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006)). The Railworks Corp. factors are:
(1) overwhelming approval for the plan; (2) a close connection between the
causes of action against the third party and the causes of action against the
debtor; (3) that the injunction is essential to the reorganization; and (4) that
the plan of reorganization provides for payment of substantially all of the
claims affected by the injunction.
See id. (citing In re Railworks Corp., 345 B.R. at 536).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See id. at 713.
388. 591 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2010).
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dural hurdles a debtor must meet to retain his car in bankruptcy.
If a debtor intends to retain the car, §§ 362(h) and 521(a)(6) of the
Bankruptcy Code require a debtor to file a statement of intention
setting forth either the intent to reaffirm the debt in a reaffirma-
tion agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) or the intent to redeem
the property by paying off the full amount of the lien under 11
U.S.C. § 722.89 Before BAPCPA was enacted in 2005, the Fourth
Circuit had recognized a third, so-called "ride-through" option:
even if a debtor did not reaffirm or redeem, the "ride-through op-
tion permitted Chapter 7 debtors who were current on their in-
stallment payments to continue making payments and retain col-
lateral after discharge. ,,390
In Jones, the debtor, Mr. Jones, filed a statement indicating
that he would continue making his car payments but did not indi-
cate whether or not he intended to reaffirm or redeem the debt.9
Jones also did not timely redeem the car or execute a reaffirma-
tion agreement, and the bankruptcy court entered an order at the
lender's request confirming that the automatic stay had termi-
nated so that the lender could repossess the vehicle based on the
default caused by the debtor's bankruptcy filing (i.e., a default
under an ipso facto provision).392 After entry of that order, the
lender repossessed the vehicle."'
Jones and his wife (who was not a joint debtor but was a co-
owner of the vehicle with Jones) filed a lawsuit against the lender
in the bankruptcy court and obtained an injunction against the
sale of the vehicle and providing for the return of the vehicle to
the Joneses.394 The bankruptcy court, relying on the "ride-
through" option under which a Chapter 7 debtor like Jones may
keep the vehicle so long as payments remain current, held that
the lender had no right to repossess the vehicle even though
Jones did not timely reaffirm the debt or redeem the vehicle by
paying off the liens in full. 9 ' The lender appealed to the district
court and won: the district court held that BAPCPA eliminated
389. Id. at 309 & n.1 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(h), 521(a)(2), 524(c), 722 (2006)).
390. Id. at 310 (citing Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger),
962 F.2d 345, 347-49 (4th Cir. 1992)).
391. Id. at 309.
392. Id. at 310.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. (citing In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347-49).
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the ride-through option."' The lender won again at the Fourth
Circuit; the Fourth Circuit agreed that BAPCPA abrogated the
Fourth Circuit's prior ruling in Belanger that endorsed the ride-
through option.
39 7
The Fourth Circuit's analysis is straightforward and based on
the plain language of the applicable Bankruptcy Code sections as
they exist after BAPCPA. First, the court explained why it had
endorsed the ride-through option before BAPCPA:
In re Belanger analyzed the language of former § 521(2)(A), which
required a debtor to file a statement of intention which, "if applica-
ble," indicated the debtor's intent to either redeem the collateral or
reaffirm the debt secured by the collateral. We interpreted the lan-
guage "if applicable" to mean that the options of redeeming or reaf-
firming were not exclusive and, therefore, the property could ride
through the bankruptcy unaffected if the debtor chose to retain the
property and continue making payments.3 8
Next, the court explained that, while BAPCPA did not effect
material changes to former § 521(2)(A), BAPCPA did introduce
changes in other sections with a significant impact on the analy-
sis: "[F]ormer § 521(2)(C) has been amended as follows: 'nothing
in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the
debtor's or the trustee's rights with regard to such property under
this title, except as provided in section 362(h)."'"9 Section 362(h) in
turn provides in relevant part that the debtor must, "if retaining
such personal property [e.g., a vehicle], either redeem such per-
sonal property... [or] enter into [a reaffirmation] agreement
.... ,400 Section 362(h) also provides that if a debtor fails to file the
required statement of intention, the stay terminates, and the
property is no longer property of the estate.0 1
In addition, the Fourth Circuit pointed out an entirely new sec-
tion added by BAPCPA that impacts the analysis:
Section 521(a)(6), added by BAPCPA, also evidences that the ride-
through option has been eliminated. That section provides that a
396. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23; Daimler Chrysler Fin. Servs., Ams. LLC v. Jones (In re
Jones), 397 B.R. 775, 787 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2008).
397. Id. at 311-12 (citing Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006)).
398. Id. at 311 (citing In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 345-47).
399. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (2006)).
400. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(A) (2006).
401. Id.
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debtor may not retain possession of personal property which is sub-
ject to a secured claim unless the debtor either reaffirms the debt or
redeems the property, according to the debtor's statement of inten-
tion required by §§ 521(a)(2) and 362(h), within 45 days of the first
meeting of creditors. This section further provides that if the debtor
fails to so act within the 45-day period, the stay is terminated, the
property is no longer considered part of the estate, and "the creditor
may take whatever action as to such property as is permitted by ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law. 40 2
Thus, after BAPCPA and the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Jones, an individual debtor in the Fourth Circuit has three op-
tions when it comes to a vehicle: (i) surrender it; (ii) keep it by
paying off the liens in full; or (iii) enter into a reaffirmation
agreement with the secured creditor.
XVII. PRO SE ACTIONS
It is widely accepted that courts will afford pro se parties con-
siderable leeway when enforcing pleading and other procedural
requirements. As recognized by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Stewart v. HSBC Bank,
USA, however, this deference is not unlimited.40 3 In Stewart, the
pro se plaintiff filed a seventy-nine page complaint containing full
copies of court documents, generally incomprehensible allega-
tions, and very few facts.4 4 Noting the Supreme Court's require-
ments in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly that a pleading contain
"'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plead-
er is entitled to relief" and more than "unadorned accusa-
tion[s],""4 the court found the plaintiffs complaint to be woefully
inadequate and dismissed the case.0 "While pro se actions are to
be generously construed," the court stated, "federal courts are not
required to 'conjure up questions never squarely presented to
them.""40
402. In re Jones, 591 F.3d at 311 (quoting 11 U.S.C § 521(a)(7) (2006)).
403. No. 3:10CV586, 2010 WL 3522087, at *1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 2010).
404. Id.
405. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
406. Stewart, 2010 WL 3522087, at *1, *3 (citations omitted).
407. Id. at *1 (quoting Beaudett v. Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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XVIII. SINGLE ASSET REAL ESTATE
In In re Light Foot Group LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Maryland held that a debtor that owned several con-
tiguous parcels of property containing seventeen housing units of
varying types was a single asset real estate entity as defined by
§ 101(51B) of the Bankruptcy Code."' Section 101(51B) states:
The term "single asset real estate" means real property constituting
a single property or project, other than residential real property with
fewer than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all of
the gross income of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which
no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than
the business of operating the real property and activities inci-
dental."
409
The debtor argued that the property did not qualify as single as-
set real estate because it had differing intended future uses for
each parcel of property, because none of the buildings on the
property contained more than four units, and because the debtor
also operated an affiliate company on the property that performed
repair work on the buildings.410
The court rejected each of the debtor's arguments.' First, the
court found that the only discussion of the various parcels in the
debtor's plan of reorganization and cash flow projections attached
to the disclosure statement regarded rental income derived from
the property and did not indicate any other current or future in-
tended uses for the parcels. 2 The court concluded that the only
business of the debtor was the generation of rental income from a
single property.13 Next, the court disagreed with the debtor's in-
terpretation of § 101(51B), finding that the phrase "real property
constituting a single property or project," other than residential
real property with fewer than four residential units, requires only
that the property as a whole contain four or more residential
units.4" Finally, the court dismissed the debtor's argument that
the presence of its affiliated company on the property removes the
408. 66 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1626, 1630-31 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011).
409. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
410. In re Light Foot Group LLC, 66 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) at 1629-30.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 1629.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 1629-30 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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debtor from single asset real estate status."' The court found that
this affiliate, which was engaged in the repair and installation of
HVAC systems, performed work for the debtor that was required
to meet the debtor's obligations as a landlord and, therefore, was
incidental to the business."' Accordingly, the court concluded that
the debtor was a single asset real estate under § 101(51B).4 7
XIX. TAX ISSUES
A decision involving both the Internal Revenue Code and the
Bankruptcy Code probably would rank on most lawyers' top ten
list of un-sexiest decisions. But the Supreme Court's five-to-four
decision on those statutory regimes in Hall v. United States, sexy
or not, likely will have a significant impact on tax and bankruptcy
planning for family farmers seeking relief in bankruptcy court
under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.41
In general, a Chapter 12 plan of reorganization must provide
for payment in full of all priority claims,419 but as a result of a
change wrought by BAPCPA, a Chapter 12 debtor may treat cer-
tain governmental claims resulting from the disposition of farm
assets as unsecured, nonpriority claims that are dischargeable.42
This exception, however, applies only to claims that are "entitled
to priority under section 507" of the Bankruptcy Code.42" ' At issue
in Hall were post-petition taxes resulting from the Chapter 12
debtors' (the Halls') sale of their farm shortly after filing a bank-
ruptcy petition. '22 The question was whether the IRS's tax claim
was entitled to priority under § 507 as an administrative expense
on account of .'tax[es] ... incurred by the estate"' under § 503(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code.42
The Halls filed a proposed plan in which the tax claim would be
paid as a general unsecured claim to the extent funds were avail-
able to pay unsecured creditors, and any unpaid excess would be
415. Id. at 1630.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1630-31.
418. See 566 U.S -,... 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1885-86 (2012).
419. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 1885 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2) (2006)).
420. See id. at -., 132 S. Ct. at 1885 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A)).
421. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1885 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A)).
422. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1885, 1886.
423. Id. at__, 132 S. Ct. at 1886 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006)).
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discharged.24 The IRS objected and argued that the tax claim was
not "incurred by the estate" and was neither collectible nor dis-
chargeable in the Halls' bankruptcy case.2 The bankruptcy court
agreed with the IRS and sustained the IRS's objection to the
Halls' proposed plan because a Chapter 12 estate is not a sepa-
rate taxable entity under the Internal Revenue Code. 26 On appeal
to the district court, the district court reversed in favor of the
Halls because the district court disagreed with the bankruptcy
court's reliance on Internal Revenue Code provisions to con-
strue § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and because the district
court concluded that the legislative history of § 1222(a)(2)(A) was
intended to apply to post-petition taxes incurred by Chapter 12
debtors. 27 On further appeal by the IRS to the Ninth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's initial decision.4 2 The Halls then appealed to the
Supreme Court but were unsuccessful. 2
First, the Supreme Court gave the phrase "incurred by the es-
tate" a "plain and natural reading" and held that the phrase re-
fers to "a tax for which the estate itself is liable.4  The Supreme
Court then referred to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
providing that a separate taxable estate is created when an indi-
vidual debtor files a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
but not when an individual debtor files a Chapter 12 or Chapter
13 bankruptcy petition.42 ' For the Supreme Court, these Internal
Revenue Code provisions
suffice to resolve this case: Chapter 12 estates are not taxable enti-
ties. [The Halls], not the estate itself, are required to file the tax re-
turn and are liable for the taxes resulting from their postpetition
farm sale. The postpetition federal income tax liability is not "in-
curred by the estate" and thus is neither collectible nor dischargea-
ble in the Chapter 12 plan.
4
3
2
424. See id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1886.
425. Id. at __ 132 S. Ct. at 1886.
426. See id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1886 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 1398, 1399 (2006)).
427. See id. at__, 132 S. Ct. at 1886.
428. Id. (citing Hall v. United States, 617 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2010)).
429. See id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 1893.
430. Id. at __ 132 S. Ct. at 1887 (citing FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. .. 131 S.
Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011)).
431. Id. at-_, 132 S. Ct. at 1887 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 1398(1), 1399, 6012(b)(4) (2006)).
432. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 1887 (footnote omitted),
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Interestingly, only after construing the Internal Revenue Code
did the Court address whether its holding on the meaning of the
phrase "incurred by the estate" as used in the Bankruptcy Code
comported with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 3 The
Court examined § 346 from its inception in the 1978 enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code through its most recent amendment in
BAPCPA. 34 The Court declared that § 346 "crystallized the con-
nection between the Bankruptcy Code and the IRC" because § 346
sets forth (and always has set forth) "a chapter-specific division of
tax liabilities between the estate and the debtor," and, after
BAPCPA, even includes an express reference to the Internal Rev-
enue Code provisions discussed above.4 5 After a foray into analo-
gous Chapter 13 provisions and case law, the court summarized:
"We hold that the federal income tax liability resulting from [the
Halls'] postpetition farm sale is not 'incurred by the estate' under
§ 503(b) and thus is neither collectible nor dischargeable in the
Chapter 12 plan. 436
The result in Hall would have been entirely different if only the
Halls had sold their farm before they filed their Chapter 12 peti-
tion, because pre-petition taxes would have been subject to the
exception enacted by BAPCPA in § 1222(a)(2)."7 Thus, after Hall,
a family farmer (and his tax and bankruptcy professionals) will
need to carefully consider the timing of any sales of farm assets in
connection with the filing of a Chapter 12 petition.
XX. TRUSTEES
In Spain v. Williams (In re Williams), the Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia was asked to determine the
membership as well as to appoint a member to wind up the af-
fairs of a Virginia limited liability company ("LLC") engaged in
contracting and construction projects.438 The adversary proceeding
in Spain originated in a Virginia circuit court when Sandra
433. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 1887.
434. See id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 1887-89 (citations omitted).
435. See id. at 132 S. Ct. at 1888-89 (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2565; Bankruptcy Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)).
436. Id. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 1893.
437. See id. at , 132 S. Ct. at 1893.
438. 455 B.R. 485, 494 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
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Spain, a purported member of the LLC, initiated an action
against another purported member, Thaddeus Williams, as well
as a general contractor of a project on which the LLC had been a
subcontractor, seeking money owed on a construction project and
damages from a multitude of additional claims."' After Spain,
Williams, and John Sprouse, a third potential member of the
LLC, separately all sought relief under the Bankruptcy Code, the
case was removed to the bankruptcy court.440 Spain later amended
her complaint to ask the court to either disregard the LLC as a
legal entity or to appoint her as liquidating trustee.44'
After reviewing the organizational documents of the LLC, the
court found that although the LLC had been properly constituted
under Virginia law, it had not properly named any members un-
der the statutory procedures set forth in Virginia Code section
13.1. 442 The court thus looked to extrinsic evidence to determine
the membership of the corporation.443 The court found that alt-
hough Williams and Sprouse had been the original members of
the LLC, Sprouse had transferred his interest to Spain in ex-
change for personal guarantees and capital contributions.4 Un-
der Virginia law, however, an assignment of a membership inter-
est does not automatically entitle the transferee to participate in
the management of an LLC or to exercise any rights of a member;
rather, such an assignment only transfers the right to receive any
share of profits and losses and distributions to which the assignor
would be entitled. ' The court held that while Williams and Spain
each owned fifty percent of the LLC, only Williams was a full
member.4
The court then addressed the proper method for winding up the
affairs of the LLC. Generally, the members of an LLC may wind
up the company's affairs.447 However, under Virginia Code section
13.1-1040.1(6)(a), "[A] member is dissociated from a limited liabil-
439. Id. at 487-88.
440. Id. at 488.
441. Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
442. Id. at 494-95 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1039(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum.
Supp. 2010)).
443. Id. at 495.
444. Id. at 497-98.
445. Id. at 498 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1039(A)).
446. Id.
447. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1048(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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ity company upon... [t]he member's [b]ecoming a debtor in
bankruptcy."4 ' While dissociated members retain their rights to
any profits, losses, or distributions from the company, they no
longer possess full membership entitling them to participate in
the management of the company's affairs.449 As all potential
members of the LLC were in bankruptcy, the court concluded
that, by operation of the Virginia Code, no member of the LLC
was capable of winding up the company's affairs.'
The court thus elected to appoint a liquidating trustee pursu-
ant to Virginia Code section 13.1-1048(B), which permits 'the cir-
cuit court of the locality in which the registered office of the lim-
ited liability company is located ... [to] appoint one or more
liquidating trustees.""" The bankruptcy court found that it stood
in the stead of the circuit court by virtue of the notice of removal
and therefore had assumed the powers of the circuit court to ad-
minister the affairs of the company."'
XXI. VALUATION
The court in Gray v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Gray) consid-
ered motions for default judgment filed in two separate cases to
strip off subordinate deeds from the debtors' respective homes."5'
Although the lenders did not defend the claims and were in de-
fault, the court refused to enter default judgment because of defi-
ciencies in the evidence presented regarding the value of the
properties.454
While the court accepted the amount stated in the proofs of
claim filed by the senior lenders as the balance of the first deed of
trust liens as of the petition date, it took issue with the methods
by which the debtors derived their valuation of the properties.4 5
One debtor based her valuation on a competitive market analysis
448. Id. § 13.1-1040.1(6)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
449. See id. §§ 13.1-1002, -1040.2 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
450. In re Williams, 455 B.R at 502 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1048 (Repl. Vol. 2006
& Cum. Supp. 2010)).
451. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1048(B)).
452. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (2006)).
453. Nos. 09-14445-RGM, 09-14004-RMC, 2010 WL 276179, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
Jan. 15, 2010).
454. Id.
455. Id.
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conducted four months prior to the petition date that did not in-
clude any adjustments to the value based on the nuances of the
debtor's property and simply listed eleven other properties with
somewhat similar characteristics. 416 The second debtor submitted
a printout of an Internet valuation that listed four properties that
the valuation deemed to be "comparable., '41' The printout did not
list any information except the sale price and the number of bed-
rooms and bathrooms and did not provide any indication as to
how the website arrived at the valuation.458 The second debtor al-
so submitted a county tax assessment to bolster the Internet val-
uation.459
The court refused to accept any of the valuations provided by
the debtors. 6 ' With respect to the comparative market analysis,
the court held that it could not rely on the resulting valuation be-
cause of the failure to conduct an actual analysis of the peculiar
features of the debtor's property.46' The analysis looked at other
purportedly similar properties but failed to make adjustments for
lot size, renovations, condition, or proximity to the debtor's prop-
erty.462 The court similarly found the Internet valuation and tax
assessments to be wanting because they provided no description
of the methods by which the valuations were reached."' The court
noted that these valuations generally are based on statistical
models that often do not take into account the specific features of
a property and are therefore unreliable." Noting that granting
default judgment is at the discretion of the trial court and is not
an entitlement as a matter of right,465 the court found that the
valuations were insufficiently reliable to support the entry of de-
fault judgment and denied the motions. 6
456. Id.
457. Id. at *2.
458. Id. at *2-3.
459. See id. at *3.
460. Id. at*4.
461. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).
462. Id.
463. Id. at *3.
464. Id. at *4.
465. Id. (citing Ganther v. Ingle 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996); Silva v. Madison, 69
F.3d 1368, 1377 (7th Cir. 1995); Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1993)).
466. Id.
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In Mitchem v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Mitchem),
the court was confronted with the question of how to value a
property that, due to the completely unfinished state of the
ground floor, had very few comparable properties from which a
value could be derived.467 The first floor of the debtors' property
was in the process of being renovated and was, in the court's
words, an "empty shell[. ' ',66 The traditional comparable market
analysis valuation method, which uses recent sale prices of prop-
erties in a similar area and with similar attributes to determine a
likely value of a particular property, was therefore impractica-
ble.469 The court therefore accepted a substitute methodology by
which the property would be valued by estimating the value of
the property after all repairs and renovations are completed and
then subtracting the value of such renovations.
467. 455 B.R. 108, 109 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2011).
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 110.
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